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INTRODUCTION
It has traditionally been stated that intellectual property rights1
(“IPRs”) and antitrust law conflict with each other.2 The conflict
arises because intellectual property law creates and protects
monopoly power, while antitrust law proscribes it.3 An additional
explanation for this conflict stems from antitrust law’s focus on
attaining competitive market conditions not particular outcomes, as
opposed to intellectual property law’s preoccupation with ensuring
the optimum amount of innovation.4
Recently, regulatory regimes have tried to reconcile these
conflicting objectives by emphasizing the common purpose of
intellectual property law and antitrust law: promoting innovation and
enhancing consumer welfare.5 This reconciliatory approach departs
from the traditional view of IPRs as instruments of potential antitrust
infringements.6 Despite commonalities, the intersection between the
two bodies of law has produced heavy litigation.7 Attempts by U.S.
courts to reconcile the conflict between IPRs and antitrust liability
1
Intellectual property rights encompass patents, copyrights, trademarks, know-how,
trade dress, registered designs, plant breeders’ rights, and other similar related rights granted
under national law, such as performance rights or broadcasting rights.
2
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9th Cir.
1997) [hereinafter Kodak II].
3
Id. (quoting United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.
1981)).
4
David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the Information Age: Computer
Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
771, 773-74 (1996).
5
See e.g., U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (April 6, 1995), reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,132 [hereinafter IP Guidelines]; Debra A. Valentine, General
Counsel of the FTC, Abuse of Dominance in Relation to Intellectual Property: U.S.
Perspectives and the Intel Cases, (Nov. 15, 1999) (remarks at the Israel International
Antitrust Conference), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvisraelin.htm (last
visited Mar. 9, 2001).
6
James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property
Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 344 (1996).
7
See Michael H. Kauffman, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.:
Taking One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in Reconciling Intellectual Property Rights
and Antitrust Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 471, 503-05 (1999).
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have not reduced the legal uncertainty in this field of law.8 The two
bodies of law make use of different methods in achieving their
common goals.9 Antitrust law assumes that deterring monopolies
will lead to the attainment of economic efficiency, while intellectual
property law assumes that efficiency will be achieved only if
regulators correctly estimate the proper mix of incentive and access
to IPRs as needed to provide the optimal amount of innovation.10 As
this essay explains, this uncertainty concerning the amount of
incentives necessary to guarantee optimal innovation has proven
problematic in the intellectual property law context.11
This essay will examine the application of the essential facilities
doctrine to refusals to license IPRs in the United States (“U.S.”) and
the European Union (“EU”). The application of the essential
facilities doctrine to IPRs reflects the tension between antitrust law
and intellectual property law.12 A complex issue in antitrust law
concerns determining whether a refusal to license intellectual
property by a company with market or monopoly power infringes
Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community13 or
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.14
8
Compare Kodak II (affirming a jury verdict for ISOs against Kodak, ruling that a
patent owner’s unilateral refusal to deal may violate antitrust laws where it is motivated by
an anti-competitive purpose), with In re Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F. 3d
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming a summary judgment in favor of Xerox, ruling that Xerox
was under no obligation to sell or license its patented parts and did not violate the antitrust
laws by refusing to do so).
9
Thomas F. Cotter, Intellectual Property and the Essential Facilities Doctrine, 44
ANTITRUST BULL. 211, 227-28 (Spring 1999).
10
Id.
11
See discussion infra. Section IV.A.2.
12
Cotter, supra note 9, at 235.
13
See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340)
3 (1997), [hereinafter EC TREATY] (incorporating changes made by TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1. Note that the EC TREATY was amended by the TREATY
OF AMSTERDAM; see TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION,
THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS,
Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]. After the reform
introduced by the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, Articles 85 and 86 of the EC TREATY have
become Articles 81 and 82 respectively. Note: European Community (“EC”) competition
law refers to “dominant position” to describe what U.S. Antitrust Law refers to as “market
power.” This essay uses these terms interchangeably.
14
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990).
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This essay highlights the differences between the EU and U.S.
approaches and analyzes the recent inroads antitrust law has had in
the sacrosanct domain of IPRs on both sides of the Atlantic.15 Even
though the prima facie elements to finding antitrust liability under
the essential facilities doctrine are similar in the EU and U.S., the
elements have been applied differently in their respective
jurisdictions.16 Notwithstanding this difference, in both the EU and
U.S. it is difficult to rely on the essential facilities doctrine to force a
dominant owner to license its IPRs.17
Section II of this essay analyzes the differing origins and
approaches taken by the EU and U.S. authorities towards the
essential facilities doctrine. Section III discusses the application of
the essential facilities doctrine to refusals to deal. Section IV focuses
on recent developments in the EU and U.S. in the application of this
doctrine to refusals to license. Section V comments on the
shortcomings of the approaches taken by U.S. jurisprudence towards
compulsory licensing and analyzes the alternative approaches
proposed by scholars regarding the application of antitrust laws to
refusals to license. Finally, Section VI concludes that U.S.
intellectual property (“IP”) holders who refuse to license their IPRs
contend with more legal uncertainty than their European
counterparts.
I. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TOWARDS THE APPLICATION OF THE
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IN THE EUROPEAN AND THE UNITED
STATES
In spite of its U.S. origins, the essential facilities doctrine now
appears to be more important in EC competition law than in U.S.
antitrust law.18 The essential facilities doctrine is applicable to a
broader range of situations in the EU than in the U.S. and, therefore,
15

See Kobak, supra note 6, at 354-54.
Id. at 346-47.
17
See Cotter, supra note 9, at 235, 250.
18
See John Temple Lang, Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to
Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, 18 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 437, 484-85
(1994).
16
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companies tend to rely more heavily on the essential facilities
doctrine in the EU than in the U.S.19 Two main factors drive these
different approaches to the use of the essential facilities doctrine: (i)
the different development of the essential facilities doctrine in the
EU and the U.S., and; (ii) the strong influence that the economic
model proposed by the Chicago School20 has exerted upon U.S.
antitrust agencies (the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice) and the judiciary.21
The development of the essential facilities doctrine has been
different in the EU and the U.S.22 As Section III.B explains below,
EC competition law imposes upon dominant firms a general duty to
share as well as a duty to supply.23 The existence of these
obligations obviates the need to construe an essential facilities
doctrine in the EU. Contrariwise, the U.S. does not impose such
general duties upon dominant firms.24 Section 2 of the Sherman Act
does, however, prohibit monopolization and attempts to
monopolize.25 Additionally, U.S. case law has relied on the essential
facilities doctrine to create an exception to the general principle that
firms do not have a duty to deal.26 Under this doctrine, the owners of
an essential facility may be found to monopolize in the meaning of

19

James S. Venit & John J. Kallaugher, Essential Facilities: A Comparative Approach,
1994 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 315, 333 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1995); Mercer H. Harz,
Dominance and Duty in the European Union: A Look Through Microsoft Windows at the
Essential Facilities Doctrine, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 189, 190 (1997).
20
The Chicago School of economics considers efficiency the fundamental goal to be
achieved in the market. This theory espouses the notion that businesses exist to maximize
profit. As such, the market compels businesses to make rational decisions that promote
efficiencies. Whereas competition secures market efficiencies, antitrust laws merely
function to further support market created efficiencies. In essence, this school of thought
views the market as a self-correcting force that punishes individuals who pursue inefficient
practices. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 938-44 (1979).
21
Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 344.
22
Harz, supra note 19, at 189-90.
23
See Lang, supra note 18, at 521; Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 332-33;
Valentine Korah, The Ladbroke Saga, 3 EUR. COMP. L.R. 169, 174 (1998).
24
See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 332-33.
25
See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990).
26
Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 316.
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Section 2, unless they make the facility available to outsiders.27
These differing approaches partly explain why practitioners find it
easier to rely on the essential facilities doctrine in the EU as opposed
to the U.S.28 Moreover, these differing approaches also explain in
part the narrower approach taken by American courts in invoking the
essential facilities doctrine only in extreme cases.29 Professor
Areeda, concerned with the impact of this doctrine in reducing
incentives to investment, identified those cases as examples of where
a group of competitors acquires an existing bottleneck, such as what
occurred in United States v. Terminal Railroad Association. 30
Additionally, one should also consider that U.S. agencies and
courts have been strongly influenced by the economists of the
Chicago School.31 According to Chicago School economists,
antitrust law should only concern itself with the efficient operation of
the markets, without regard to sociopolitical objectives.32 In the EU,
the European Commission (the “Commission”) has never been
directly influenced by the theories of the Chicago School.33 Policy
and social concerns command greater attention in EC competition
law than in U.S. antitrust law.34 For instance, the outcome of the
Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission and Independent Television
Publications Ltd. v. Commission (“Magill”)35 case can be attributed
to the subordinate consideration Europeans give market efficiency as
compared to sociopolitical interests.36
The EC Treaty places great emphasis on the sociopolitical
objective of achieving an integrated economy throughout the
27

P. Ahern, Refusals to Deal After Aspen, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 153, 166-82 (1994).
Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 334-36.
29
See Philip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 841-42 (1989); Korah, supra note 23, at 174.
30
See Areeda supra note 29 at 841-842; see generally United States v. Terminal R.R.
Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
31
Harz, supra note 19, at 197. See also supra text accompanying note 20.
32
Harz, supra note 19, at 197.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995
E.C.R. I-743.
36
Id.; see discussion infra Section IV.C.2
28
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European Union.37 EC competition law functions as an instrument to
bring about a common market.38 This goal of integrating the
economies of the Member States of the EU has influenced how the
Commission, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) as well as the
European Court of First Instance (“CFI”) utilize the essential
facilities doctrine.39
Market integration may control the application of essential
facilities in two ways. First, with regard to the jurisprudence of EC
Courts, concern for market integration affects how the courts
interrelate EC Treaty40 provisions regarding the free movement of
goods to the use of IPRs.41 It is beyond the scope of this essay to
provide an analysis of this case law; however, it is important to note
that this jurisprudence restricts the scope, and indirectly diminishes
the value, of IPRs in the EU by having interpreted very broadly the
“doctrine of exhaustion” of IPRs into the common market.42
According to the “exhaustion doctrine,” it is contrary to Articles 28
and 30 of the EC Treaty for an IP holder to assert its rights in one
Member State to prevent parallel imports of patented products put in
the market of another Member State by any of its licensees or with
its consent.43 The exhaustion of IPRs is not unknown to U.S. law. In
the U.S., patents, trademarks and copyrights are subject to a “firstsale doctrine.”44 An IP owner “cannot ordinarily prevent or control
the sale of goods bearing the mark once the owner has permitted
those goods to enter commerce.”45

37

Emmanuel P. Mastromanolis, Insights from U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and
Restricted Territorial Distribution: The Creation of a New Legal Standard for European
Union Competition Law, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 559, 562 (1995).
38
Id.
39
See id. at 563.
40
EC Treaty, supra note 13, at arts. 28-30.
41
Mastromanolis, supra note 37, at 569.
42
Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147; see VALENTINE
KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW & PRACTICE, §§ 8.1-.4 (6th ed.
1997).
43
See Korah supra note 42§§ 8.1-.4.
44
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. b. (1995); see also Adams
v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1874); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
45
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 44, at § 24 cmt. b.
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In light of this jurisprudence — which erodes the usefulness of
IPRs, namely, the right to exclude others from using or making the
goods or services protected by those rights — it should come as no
surprise that the Commission and EC Courts could broadly apply the
essential facilities doctrine as a basis to compel the licensing of
IPRs.46 For instance, the distinction between the “existence” of the
IPRs and their “exercise” in Magill reflects the powerful influence
continually exerted by the EU’s concern for common market
integration.47 The Commission’s distinction between IPRs and their
actual use enables it to subordinate nationally granted IPRs to the
integrationist interests of the EU.48
The second reason for the more prominent use of the essential
facilities doctrine in the EU derives from the recent break-up of
state-owned monopolies.49 The recent history of state-controlled
industries in Europe, which the member states began to privatize in
the 1990s, has left many more dominant positions in the EU than
exist in the U.S.50 The doctrine of essential facilities is seen by the
Commission as an additional antitrust instrument to deter companies
and former incumbents from abusing their dominant positions.51

46

See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 334-35.
See Ian S. Forrester, Magill, “A Famous Victory”? Third Party Access to Intellectual
Property Rights, in 2 INT’L INTELL. PROP. LAW & POL’Y, §§ 35-7 to 8 (Hugh C. Hansen ed.,
1996).
48
Id. at §§ 35-5 to 10.
49
Harz, supra note 19, at 198 n. 65; Lang, supra note 18, at 483.
50
Harz, supra note 19, at 198 n. 65; Lang, supra note 18, at 483.
51
See Lang, supra note 18, at 483.
47
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II. THE APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE TO
REFUSALS TO DEAL
A. Overview
1. Concept
Neither EU nor U.S. law provides a legal definition of the essential
facilities doctrine, and in both systems its contours are still unclear.52
Some commentators have pointed out that the essential facilities
doctrine is not so much a method of analyzing antitrust cases, but
rather a useful label to describe the factual posture of cases.53 The
essential facilities doctrine refers to a situation where a dominant
firm owns or controls a facility that is indispensable to its
competitors and refuses to grant access to that facility.54 An essential
facility can be a product, like a raw material55 or a replacement
part;56 a license of an intellectual property right;57 a service, such as
access to a computerized airline reservation system;58 a harbor;59
52

Harz, supra note 19, at 221-23.
Lang, supra note 18, at 483 (noting that “[e]ssential facility cases involve basic
principles [and the] concept may be merely a useful label . . . rather than an analytical
tool”); PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBER HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 650-51 (Supp. 1995)
(stating that “[E]ssential facility’ is just an epithet . . . . It is not an independent tool of
analysis, but only a label-a label that beguiles some commentators and courts into
pronouncing a duty to deal without analyzing the implications . . . .”).
54
See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 650-51.
55
E.g., Joined Cases 6 & 7/73R, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA et Commercial
Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 0357.
56
E.g., Commission Decision 87/500/EEC Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 86 of
the EEC Treaty (IV/32.279 – BBI/Boosey & Hawkes Interim Measures), 1987 O.J. (L 286)
36.
57
E.g., Case T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. II-485; Joined
Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-743.
58
E.g., Commission Decision 92/213/EEC Relating to a Procedure Pursuant to Articles
85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/33,544, British Midland v. Aer Lingus), 1992 O.J. (L 96)
34; Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving a
similar U.S. example).
59
E.g., Case IV/34.174, B&I Line PLC v. Sealink Harbour Ltd. & Sealink Stena Ltd., 5
C.M.L.R. 255 (1992); Commission Decision 94/119/EC Concerning a Refusal to Grant
53
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railway facilities;60 a football stadium;61 a power generation or
telecommunication network;62 the landing and take off slots of
airports;63 or an airport needed to provide ground services.64 The
duty to provide access to the facility arises when the dominant firm’s
competitor faces an insurmountable barrier of access to the market if
deprived of access to the facility.65 Additionally, the duty to provide
access arises when lack of access subjects competitors to a serious,
permanent and inescapable competitive handicap that would render
their activities uneconomical.66
A degree of confusion exists concerning the relationship between
the essential facilities doctrine and the “monopoly leveraging
doctrine.”67 While the two doctrines often overlap,68 both theories
Access to the Facilities of the Port of Rødby, 1994 O.J. (L 55) 52; Driscoll v. City of New
York, 650 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (involving a similar U.S. example).
60
E.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); Laurel Sand &
Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1309 (D. Md. 1989), aff’d, 924 F.2d 539
(4th Cir. 1991).
61
E.g., Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 848 F.2d 976 (9th
Cir. 1988).
62
E.g., Commission Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access
Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (C 265) 2. A brief commentary
on this Notice can be found in Sergio Baches Opi, Comunicación sobre la Aplicación de las
Normas de Competencia a los Acuerdos de Acceso en el Sector de las Telecomunicaciones,
654 Revista General del Derecho, 2517-18 (Mar. 1999); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983) (concerning similar U.S. examples).
63
E.g., Commission Regulation 1617/93, 1993 O.J. (L 155) 18; Council Regulation
95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 14) 1.
64
E.g., Commission Decision 98/190/EC Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of
the EC Treaty, 1998 O.J. (L 72) 30.
65
See Lang, supra note 18, at 439.
66
See id. at 487; see Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544
(9th Cir. 1991); Twin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir.
1990); Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Giles Mem’l Hosp., 846 F. Supp. 488, 498
(W.D. Va. 1994). Perhaps because the essential facility doctrine is seen as a label to
describe a factual situation, some commentators, especially in the U.S., have questioned
whether this doctrine is necessary at all. This school of thought argues that refusals of
access that increase or maintain market power are already subject to attack as a group
boycott, monopolization, or attempt to monopolize. See James R. Ratner, Should There Be
an Essential Facility Doctrine?, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 327, 382 (1988); Areeda, supra note
29, at 841.
67
In the U.S. the “monopoly leveraging doctrine” refers to those situations where a
company uses its monopoly power in one market to gain a “competitive advantage” or “to
monopolize or attempt to monopolize” another market. U.S. courts have issued conflicting
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could be distinguished in different ways. First, the essential facilities
doctrine represents one of three tests used to determine whether a
monopolist has unlawfully refused to deal.69 In both the U.S. and
EU, the plaintiff in an essential facility lawsuit must objectively
prove that access to the facility is “indispensable” in order to
decisions regarding the elements to prove a monopoly leveraging case. The Second Circuit
has ruled that a firm violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act merely by obtaining a
competitive advantage in the second market, even in the absence of monopolization or an
attempt to monopolize the leveraged market. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d. 263 (2d Cir. 1979). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit rejected the “monopoly
leveraging doctrine” set forth in Berkey and instead requires proof of defendant’s use of
monopoly power in one market to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a monopoly in the leveraged
market. See Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d, at 544. In the EU, the Commission and the EC
Courts seem to have adopted a position similar to that held by the Second Circuit. In Tetra
Pak International SA v. Commission, the Commission found that Article 82 of the EC
Treaty prohibits a firm with dominant position in one market from engaging in
anticompetitive practices in a second market where the company does not enjoy dominant
position if the second market has close associative links with the market in which the firm is
dominant. In this case, Tetra Pak was not dominant in the non-aseptic market for equipment
and cartons for packaging liquids. However, the Commission found that Tetra Pak had
abused its dominant position in the markets for aseptic and non-septic equipment and
cartons, inter alia, by requiring buyers of equipment for filling cartons with milk and fruit
juice to buy the cartons from Tetra Pak. Both the CFI and the ECJ upheld the
Commission’s decision. See Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission.,
1994 E.C.R. II-755; Case 333/94P, Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R.
I-5951. The ruling of the ECJ has been criticized by some scholars for failing to explain
how the alleged links between the dominated and the non-dominated market allowed Tetra
Pak to abuse its dominance in the non-dominated market. See Valentine Korah, Tetra Pak
II – Lack of Reasoning in Court’s Judgment, 2 EUR. COMP. L.R. 98, 99 (1996). Other
commentators agree with the reasoning and holding of the ECJ. See D.G. GOYDER, EC
COMPETITION LAW 329 (1998).
68
See Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The
Twisted Journey of the “Essential Facilities” Doctrine, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 5 (1996).
For a practical example of this overlap, see, Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
69
“Changes in pattern of dealing” and the “monopoly leveraging doctrine” represent the
other two tests. See James B. Kobak, Jr., Antitrust Treatment of Refusals to License
Intellectual Property, 566 PLI/PAT 517, 519 (1999). See also Kezsbom & Goldman, supra
note 68, at 5 explaining that:
a helpful way of understanding the [essential facilities] doctrine is to view it as
a ‘branch’ of the law governing when a monopolist, or a group with aggregate
monopoly power, has a duty to deal with competitors. In practice, many cases
cited as examples of the doctrine’s purported application actually represent
traditional analysis that could have been approached utilizing some accepted
Section 2 theory, such as monopoly leveraging, or abuse of monopoly power.
Id.
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compete in the market with the firm that controls the facility.70 The
monopoly leveraging doctrine does not require such proof.71
Because indispensability is difficult to prove, the monopoly
leveraging doctrine offers plaintiffs better odds of success.72 Second,
the two doctrines can be distinguished on the basis of the scope of
the business justifications offered for refusing to deal.73 In an
essential facilities dispute, business justifications appear to be limited
to situations where access would disrupt the monopolist’s own
business, whereas traditional monopoly leveraging situations
accommodate broader business justifications.74
Not withstanding the above, U.S. plaintiffs may face fewer
obstacles when relying on the essential facilities doctrine because
U.S. courts do not require that plaintiffs define the actual market
involved.75 Moreover, relying on the essential facilities doctrine may
make it is easier for plaintiffs to prove a general intent to monopolize
or a specific intent to attempt to monopolize, as required by Section
2 of the Sherman Act.76 U.S. plaintiffs can argue that mere denial of
access to an essential facility indicates anticompetitive intent.77 It
should be noted that Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp.78 (“Aspen Skiing”) could make the task of U.S. plaintiffs more
difficult.79 In Aspen Skiing, the Supreme Court supplemented the
“intent to monopolize” test by requiring plaintiffs to establish the
existence of exclusionary or predatory conduct.80 In the EU,
situations exist where use of the essential facilities doctrine to
establish an Article 82 violation proves less onerous than reliance on
70

See Harz, supra 19, at 223.
See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 318-19.
72
See id.
73
Id.
74
See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 318-19.
75
See Helix Milling Co. v. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir.
1975) (providing no analysis of relevant geographic market); Denver Petroleum Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 304-06 (D. Colo. 1969) (holding that proof of monopoly
power and definition of the relevant market is unnecessary because of defendant’s ability to
exclude competitors from the essential facility).
76
Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 316-17.
77
See Kezsbom & Goldman, supra note 68, at 7.
78
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
79
See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 317-18.
80
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 586 (1982).
71
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the monopoly leveraging doctrine.81 Even in the absence of other
factors typically required in monopoly leveraging cases — tying of
sales, discrimination vis-à-vis another independent competitor,
discontinuation of supplies to existing customers, or deliberate action
to damage a competitor — the EU Commission has shown a
willingness to view the mere act of refusing access to an essential
facility an abuse.82
A balancing test underlies the application of the essential facilities
doctrine.83 Courts and antitrust authorities will require a dominant
company to grant access to its facilities when the economic and
social benefits for consumers in establishing higher levels of free
competition in a particular market override the right of a company to
choose those with whom it wants to deal.84 At times, however,
consumer benefits could prove ephemeral, and the obligation
imposed on a company to share its facility with competitors could
adversely effect competition for the long-term.85
Application of the essential facilities doctrine could be
overbroad.86 Despite short-term gain to consumers in terms of price,
quality and choice terms, use of the essential facilities doctrine could
have a triple negative effect on competition in the long term.87 First,
it would discourage competitors from developing alternative
competing facilities.88 Second, it would reduce the incentive for
dominant undertakings to introduce innovations in or duplicate their
essential facilities.89 Third, since someone will have to determine the
81

See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 332-35.
See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 130 at ¶
50 (1999).
83
Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 337, n. 58.
84
Id. at 336-41.
85
See Lang, supra note 18, at 512-13; Areeda, supra note 29, at 852.
86
Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 339, n. 65.
87
Areeda, supra note 29, at 851.
88
Of course, this is not the case when an incumbent passes a “tipping point” i.e., a
degree of penetration that leads to a single network dominating the field. In that event, there
will be no viable alternative networks that can be established. See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust
Analysis in High-Tech Industries: A 19th Century Discipline Addresses 21st Century
Problems, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y. 129, 136 (1999).
89
See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
82
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terms of a compulsory access or license, it invites regulatory
intervention.90 These three drawbacks particularly impinge on IPRs.
Given the tendency to misrepresent IPRs as a monopoly, misuse of
the essential facilities doctrine could be potentially damaging to the
viability of IPRs.91
2. The Basic Provisions
To understand the U.S. and EU case law dealing with the essential
facilities doctrine, one must examine the basic antitrust provisions
courts utilize to evaluate it.92 In the EU courts analyze the essential
facilities doctrine in cases concerning refusals to deal pursuant to the
framework set forth under Article 82 of the EC Treaty.93 Article 82
prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market, or in a substantial part of it, in
so far as it may affect trade between Member States.94 Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, the relevant provision in the U.S., proscribes a
person or a firm from monopolizing or attempting to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among several States, or with foreign
nations.95

Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 130 at ¶
57 (1999); Korah, supra note 22, at 174.
90
See id.
91
See Derek Ridyard, Essential Facilities and the Obligation to Supply Competitors
under UK and EC Competition Law, 17 EUR. COMP. L.R. 438, 445 (1996); In re
Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135-36 (D. Kan. 1997), aff’d,
203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
92
See generally Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19 (explaining how §§ 1, 2 of the
Sherman Act and Article 82 of the EC Treaty serves as the proper point of departure in an
analysis of the essential facilities doctrine because these statutes establish the parameters of
the doctrine’s future development).
93
Id. at 325.
94
Article 82 was previously Article 86 under the EC Treaty of Rome before its revision
pursuant to the Treaty of Amsterdam.
95
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990). Section 2 provides that:
[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,0000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or
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Commentators in the EU have tried to analogize Article 82 with
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.96 However, significant differences
between these two provisions exist.97 First, Article 82 prohibits
customer exploitation and exclusionary practices,98 while under
Section 2, U.S. courts have emphasized the exclusionary practices
against competitors by defendants.99 As United Brands v. EC
Commission100 shows, Article 82 even prohibits abuses that may not
advance the firm’s dominant position yet may cause direct harm to a
single consumer or have an anticompetitive effect in markets in
which the dominant firm does not compete.101
It is important to note that in the essential facilities field the ECJ
seems to have confined the application of Article 82 to those cases in
which the defendant’s conduct is exclusionary, namely, to those
cases in which the refusal to grant access to the facilities harms
competition.102 Under this approach, harm to a single competitor in
a market where there are other competitors does not necessarily harm
competition.103 It is important to note that the language used by the
Advocate General in Oscar Bronner represents a novel view in EC

by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Id.

96

See Harz, supra note 19, at 198.
See BARRY E. HAWK, 2 UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET & INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 743 (Supp. 1990) (discussing Article 86).
98
See CARLOS ESTEVA & STEPHEN RYAN, ARTICLE 82 – ABUSE OF A DOMINANT
POSITION 121 (Faull & Nikpay, ed., 1999). In Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can v.
Commission, the ECJ held that Article 82 “is not only aimed at practices which may cause
damage to consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their
impact on an effective competition structure.” Case 6/72, Europemballage Corp. and Cont’l
Can v. Commission., 1973 E.C.R. 215, 245 at ¶ 26 (1973).
99
See HAWK, supra note 97, at 743.
100
See Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 208, [1978] 3
C.M.L.R. 83 (1978).
101
See ESTEVA & RYAN, supra note 96, at 121; HAWK, supra note 97, at 743.
102
Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 328.
103
See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 132, at ¶
58 (1999) (holding that “it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the primary purpose
of Article 86 [now Article 82] is to prevent distortion of competition – and in particular to
safeguard the interests of consumers – rather than to protect the position of particular
competitors”).
97
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competition law.104 The ECJ did not expressly refer to this statement
of the Advocate General, but one can infer from its reasoning and
holding in Oscar Bronner that the Court essentially agreed with the
Advocate General.105
Second, the policy objective of “single market” inherent
throughout the EC Treaty also differentiates Article 82 from Section
2 of the Sherman Act.106 Conduct such as geographic price
discrimination may be condemned under Article 82 because it
contributes to the partitioning of the common market, yet escapes
Section 2 condemnation because it does not necessarily harm
competition.107 The underlying thought is that there are situations,
such as when investments involved significant sunk costs, where
discrimination in accordance with what each geographic market can
bear leads to increased product supply, and that therefore, society is
better off than if price discrimination were forbidden.108
Third, both provisions are aimed at regulating firms holding
market power, but neither Article 82 of the EC Treaty nor Section 2
of the Sherman Act prohibit dominance or monopoly power alone.109
Section 2, however, goes one step further by also prohibiting
“attempts to monopolize” a relevant market.110 To establish a
monopolization or an attempt to monopolize claim under Section 2,
one must evaluate the exclusionary conduct of the defendant that
harms competitors - and thereby consumers - in terms of the
product’s relevant market.111 A monopolization claim must be based
upon the defendant having a substantial market power.112 The
problem, however, is determining how much market power a firm
must have in order to establish an attempted monopolization claim
under Section 2.113 Market share requirements vary widely in such
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

See id. at 128, ¶¶ 45-46.
See id.
Mastromanolis, supra note 37, at 562-63.
Contra Commission Decision 80/1333, Hennesst-Henkell, 1980 O.J. (L 383) 11-15.
See Korah, supra note 23, at 172.
EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 82; 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990).
See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 447 (1993).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1990).
Id.
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cases.114 Market shares between 47%-50% or between 50%-55%
have been considered insufficient,115 but in other cases a 24% market
share has been considered sufficient.116
Unlike an outright
monopolization claim, “an attempt to monopolize” allegation does
not require that plaintiffs establish that the dominant firm possesses
market power.117 Therefore, a U.S. plaintiff can prevail in an
attempted monopolization case against a company having a market
share lower than the market share typically indicative of dominance
under Article 82.118
B. The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the European Union
Application of the essential facilities doctrine in the EU dates back
to the 1970s. 119 A detailed analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECJ
as well as the case law of the Commission dealing with essential
facilities is beyond the scope of this essay. It is necessary, however,
to briefly touch upon landmark decisions of the ECJ and the
Commission in this field to understand the different approaches
taken in the EU and U.S. regarding the essential facilities doctrine.
The ECJ has yet to make an explicit reference to the essential
facilities doctrine;120 the sole instance of such a reference occurred in
an Article 81 case before the Court of First Instance.121 A number of
ECJ cases, however, dealing with refusals to supply goods or
services by a dominant company implicitly rely on the essential
114

E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY &
PROCEDURE 728 (1999).
115
See Ford v. Stroup, 1997 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,838 (6th Cir. April 23, 1997)
(opinion unpublished); Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103,
107-08 (1st Cir. 1997).
116
See Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1298
(9th Cir. 1982).
117
See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 114, at 727.
118
See id.
119
E.g., Joined Cases 6-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial
Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 1 C.M.L.R. 309 (1974); Case 27/76,
United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 83 (1978).
120
Lang, supra note 18, at 446.
121
Joined Cases T-374/4, T-375/94, & T-388/94, ENS, Eurostar, UIC, NS, SNCF v.
Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-3141 (1998).
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facilities doctrine.122 The two leading cases in this area have been
Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents
Corp. v. Commission (“Commercial Solvents”) 123 and United
Brands Co. v. Commission (“United Brands”).124 These two cases
reflect two distinct strands in the theory of abuse under Article 82 of
the EC Treaty.125 Commercial Solvents is a monopoly leveraging
case, while United Brands deals with selective refusals to deal.126
In Commercial Solvents, the ECJ held that a company with a
dominant position in the production of a raw material could not cease
supplying an existing customer and competitor in the downstream
market for derivatives of the raw material when the refusal would
eliminate the competitor from the market.127 The ECJ found the
defendant’s purported justification for its refusal to supply - that it
would commence using the raw material to manufacture derivative
products - unpersuasive.128
In United Brands, the ECJ found that United Brands, the
distributor of Chiquita bananas, abused its dominant position by
cutting off supplies to a Danish ripener-distributor because the latter
had begun advertising bananas of a competing brand.129 Unlike
Commercial Solvents, the parties in this case were not in a
competitive relationship.130 Despite this fact, the ECJ acknowledged
that United Brands had a duty to continue supplying its Danish
distributor.131 The ECJ took into account the impact that United
Brand’s termination could have on the willingness of other
customers to distribute competing brands as well as the need to
preserve the independence of small and medium size firms in their
122
See e.g., Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH&Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH&Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 36 C.M.L.R. 1289 (1999).
123
Joined Cases 6-7/73, Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. 223.
124
Case 27/76, United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207.
125
Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 328.
126
Joined Cases 6-7/73, Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. 223; Case 27/76, United
Brands, 1978 E.C.R. 207.
127
Joined Cases 6-7/73, Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. at 250-51.
128
Id.
129
Case 27/76, United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 217.
130
Id. at 216-17.
131
Id. at 207-08.
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commercial position with a dominant company.132
There are two main differences between United Brands or
Commercial Solvents-type cases and normal essential facility cases.
First, if a dominant company tries to deny access to a facility as a
means of putting pressure on a competitor to compete less
vigorously, it is likely to commit an abuse “even if the facility is not
essential.”133 Second, in cases involving selective refusal of access
as a way of discouraging aggressive competition, courts pay
particular attention to special characteristics of the victim so as to
determine how likely refusal will cause the firm to be discouraged
from entering the market, to compete vigorously, or to be forced out
of the market entirely.134
The sweeping reasoning of the ECJ in United Brands and
Commercial Solvents may explain why the ECJ did not refer
expressly to the essential facilities doctrine in subsequent cases.135
After Commercial Solvents and United Brands the general duty to
supply was so well established that it was not necessary to
distinguish essential facilities cases from other cases involving
exclusionary conduct, although some of the latter cases may have
been susceptible to essential facilities analysis.136
The Commission first referred to the essential facilities doctrine in
two interim decisions concerning access to the Welsh Holyhead
Harbor in the Wales.137 In Sea Container v. Stena Sealink, the
complainant wanted to compete with the defendant in the market for
the transport of passengers and cars from Holyhead to Ireland.138
Stena Sealink owned the port facilities of Holyhead.139 The
Commission considered the port of Holyhead an essential facility
because it was the only British port serving this market, with no
132

Id. at 208.
Lang, supra note 18, at 507.
134
Id.
135
See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 328-30.
136
See Lang, supra note 18, at 443.
137
Case IV/34.174, B&I Line PLC v. Sealink Harbour Ltd. & Sealink Stena Ltd., 5
C.M.L.R. 255 (1992) (EC).
138
Id. at 260, ¶¶ 14-15.
139
Id. at 259, ¶ 12.
133
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feasible alternatives available.140 The trip from the nearest available
port, Liverpool, was twice the length of that from Dublin to
Holyhead.141 The building of a new port was not economically
feasible or physically possible.142 Stena Sealink had refused on
several occasions to grant access to Sea Container to the port
facilities on a non-discriminatory basis.143
The Commission
concluded that Stena Sealink had abused its dominant position in the
ferry market by refusing to give Sea Containers access to the port of
Holyhead on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.144 In this
case, however, the Commission did not have to order remedial
measures because Stena Sealink finally consented to providing
sufficient offers of additional slot times allowing plaintiffs to run a
viable ferry service.145
The Commission expanded upon the issue of leveraging market
power from the essential facility’s market to the downstream
market.146 According to the Commission, an undertaking which
occupies a dominant position in the provision of an essential facility
and itself uses that facility, and which refuses other companies
access to that facility without objective justification, or grants access
to competitors only on terms less favorable than those which it gives
to its own services, infringes Article 82 of the EC Treaty.147

140

Id. at 265, ¶¶ 39-41.
Id.
142
Id. at 265, ¶¶ 63-65. Some commentators have pointed out that the Commission was
wrong by accepting that Liverpool was not an alternative to Holyhead. N/E/R/A (NATIONAL
ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES), OSCAR BRONNER: LEGITIMATE REFUSALS TO SUPPLY, 34 (January 1999). The Commission should have taken into account that, although the
Liverpool route takes just over two hours more than the Holyhead route, the Holyhead
passenger must drive for approximately 80 miles across North Wales after leaving the main
motorway, whereas the Liverpool docks are well served by two major motorway routes. Id.
Indeed, the refusal of the Commission to grant interim measures led Sea Containers to
inaugurate a new ferry service from Liverpool. Id. As of this writing Sea Containers
continues servicing this route as advertised on its web-site. See http://www.steampacket.com/timetables/fares-ssc.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
143
Case IV/34.174, B&I Line/Stena, 5 C.M.L.R. at 255, ¶ 66.
144
Id. at ¶¶ 76-78.
145
Id. at ¶ 79.
146
Id. at ¶ 66.
147
Id. at ¶¶ 41-42.
141
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It is important to point out that, as the decision of the Commission
in Stena Sealink shows, the application of the essential facilities
doctrine does not require the parties to be in a competitive
relationship.148 The Commission decided that it also applies when
the potential competitor seeking access to the essential facilities is a
new entrant into the relevant market.149 Years later, in Flughafen
Frankfurt AG,150 the Commission appeared to go beyond Stena
Sealink by holding that the obligation of the company controlling an
essential facility to grant access to users of that essential facility also
extends to potential operators who are not users of that infrastructure
but who are willing to provide services to users of that
infrastructure.151
ECJ jurisprudence as well as the case law of the Commission has
exhibited a flexible approach towards the essential facilities doctrine
which has led complainants to rely on this doctrine as a pretext to
gain access to facilities controlled by a dominant competitor even
when access was not critical to a continued market presence.152 The
ECJ has become aware of this increasing over reliance on the
essential facilities doctrine.153 The judgment of the ECJ in Oscar
Bronner,154 on November 26, 1998, serves as an attempt to limit the
broad obligation of the doctrine.155
Mediaprint, a publisher of two Austrian newspapers with a large
market share,156 refused to grant its competitor Oscar Bronner access
148

See id. at ¶ 66; Case 27/76, United Brands, 1978 E.C.R. at 216-17.
See Case IV/34.174, B&I Line/Stena, 5 C.M.L.R. at ¶ 66.
150
Commission Decision 98/190/EC Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EC
Treaty, 1998 O.J. (L 72) 30, 43. In this case the Commission found that the Frankfurt
Airport had abused its dominant position by refusing several airlines access to the airport to
offer ramp ground services. Id.
151
See Enrico Maria Armani, One Step Beyond in the Application of the Essential
Facility Theory, 3 EC COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER 15, 18 (1999).
152
See Alan Overd & Bill Bishop, Essential Facilities: The Rising Tide, 4 EUR. COMP.
L.R. 183, 183 (1998); Pat Treacy, Essential Facilities-Is the Tide Turning?, 8 EUR. COMP.
L.R. 501, 504 (1998).
153
Pat Treacy, supra note 152, at 501.
154
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH&Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH&Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 36 C.M.L.R. 1289 (1999).
155
Pat Treacy, supra note 152, at 501.
156
Mediaprint at the time of suit controlled 46.8% of the Austrian daily newspaper
market in terms of circulation and 42% in terms of advertising revenues. Case C-7/97,
149
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to its nationwide early-morning newspaper home-delivery
network.157 According to Oscar Bronner, Mediaprint bore a duty to
grant access to its distribution network because Commercial Solvents
and its progeny require a dominant company to supply access to
competitors in the downstream market unless refusal to supply can
be objectively justified.158 Oscar Bronner contended that the access
requested was essential for its business since it was not economically
feasible, due to the limited circulation of its newspaper, to establish
its own distribution network.159
The ECJ rejected Oscar Bronner’s arguments.160 Instead, the ECJ
reconfigured its Commercial Solvents precedent by limiting the duty
to grant access to instances where, pursuant to Article 82, access to
the dominant company’s goods or services is “indispensable” to the
plaintiff company’s ability to carry out its business and where the
denial of access by the dominant company is likely to eliminate all
competition.161
Against this background, the ECJ found that Mediaprint’s
distribution network did not qualify as an essential facility.162 First,
it was undisputed that other distribution methods existed, like
mailing, retail shops, and kiosks.163 The court ruled that even though
these alternatives were less advantageous for the distribution of
certain newspapers, this drawback proved insufficient to warrant
treating Mediaprint’s distribution network as an essential facility.164
Furthermore, the ECJ noted that no technical, legal, or economic
obstacles existed that would make it difficult for any other publisher,
alone or in partnership with other publishers, to establish its own
nationwide home-delivery scheme.165
The ECJ endorsed the
reasoning of Advocate General Jacobs holding that for such access to
Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7794, ¶ 3.
157
Id. at I-7826, ¶ 23.
158
Id. at I-7826, ¶¶ 24-25.
159
Id.
160
Id. at I-7831, ¶¶ 41-44.
161
Id. at I-7831, ¶ 41.
162
Id.
163
Id. at I-7831, ¶ 43.
164
Id.
165
Id. at I-7831, ¶ 44.
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be regarded as indispensable, it would be necessary, at the very least,
to establish the economic impracticality of creating a second
newspaper home-delivery scheme with a circulation comparable to
that of the existing scheme.166 According to Advocate General
Jacobs, in assessing refusals to deal by a firm controlling an essential
facility, it is important not to lose sight that the primary purpose of
Article 82 is to prevent distortion of competition – and in particular
to safeguard the interests of consumers – rather than to protect the
interests of particular competitors.167 This implies that a refusal to
grant access only amounts to an abuse of dominant position if it has
an adverse impact on consumers.168 Such conduct will only have an
adverse impact on consumers if the dominant firm’s final product is
sufficiently insulated from competition to give it market power.169
This reasoning is coherent with the ruling of the ECJ in Commercial
Solvents, in which Commercial Solvents refused to continue
supplying the raw material ethambutol to a former customer thereby
threatening to deprive the market of one of ethambutol’s principal
manufacturers.170
The ECJ’s ruling in Oscar Bronner makes good sense from an
economic and a legal standpoint. Economically speaking, the
decision proves sensitive to the danger of the chilling effect wrought
by an overzealous application of the essential facilities doctrine to
innovative initiatives.171 The decision also recognizes that the
primary concern of antitrust law is to safeguard consumer welfare,
rather than to protect particular competitors.172 From a legal
perspective, the decision bestows greater legal certainty concerning
the conditions necessary to a finding of liability under the essential
facilities doctrine.173 In particular, the ECJ clarified its previous
166

Id. at I-7832, ¶ 46.
Id. at I-7811, ¶ 58.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
See Joined Cases 6 & 7/73R, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA et Commercial
Solvents Corp. v. Commission., 1973 E.C.R. 0357, ¶ 25.
171
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7812, ¶ 63.
172
Id. at I-7811, ¶ 58. Notice that the U.S. Supreme Court has also considered consumer
welfare as the ultimate goal of antitrust law. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3
(1997); Intergraph Corp. v Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
173
See Pat Treacy, supra note 152, at 501-04.
167
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jurisprudence by adding that a facility is only “indispensable” to the
business when no actual or potential substitutes exist.174 A plaintiff
must prove a facility to be indispensable before a court will compel
the controlling firm to provide access. 175
The ruling of the ECJ may also be interpreted as a warning to
those competitors seeking to operate as free riders of the dominant
firm’s assets.176 Reliance on the essential facilities doctrine as a
pretext to gain access to a competitor’s facilities, merely because
they are more advantageous than one’s own, fails to trigger Article
82 remedial provisions.177
Oscar Bronner shares the same philosophical underpinnings and
skepticism about a broad application of the essential facilities
doctrine as a previous decision of the CFI in an Article 81 case. In
European Night Services Ltd. and Others v. Commission (“ENS”),178
the CFI quashed a Commission decision in part on the grounds that
the Commission had misapplied the essential facilities doctrine when
granting an exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty to an
agreement between several railway companies operating a night
passenger service between the U.K. and different cities in other EU
countries.179
This new service emerged as a result of the
construction of the tunnel linking the U.K. to the European
continent.180
The CFI found that the railway companies did not enjoy a
dominant position in the relevant market.181 The CFI noted that ENS
market share in the relevant market (business travelers and leisure
travelers in the routes in question) did not exceed 7% to 8%.182 The
CFI ruled that even if the parties had dominant positions in the
174

Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7832, ¶¶ 45-46.
Id. at I-7832, ¶ 46.
176
See Pat Treacy, supra note 152, at 501-04.
177
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. at I-7832, ¶ 46.
178
Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94 & T-388/94, European Night Servs. Ltd and Other
v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-3141 (1998).
179
Id. at II-3223, ¶¶ 206-07.
180
Id. at II-3153, ¶¶ 212-13.
181
Id. at II-3226, ¶ 215.
182
Id. at II-3225, ¶ 212.
175
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passenger transportation market between the routes in question, the
essential facilities doctrine did not justify imposing on the railway
companies the duty to supply slots, locomotives, and crews to third
parties.183 Thus, the CFI found that the Commission erred in
applying the essential facilities doctrine given the existence of other
alternative providers, neither locomotives nor crews could be
considered essential.184 Likewise, the CFI found that the slots in
question were not essential since there were enough alternative slots
available.185
In summary, Oscar Bronner can be read as a corrective measure
by the ECJ to narrow what had been a broad approach to refusal to
deal cases. It also narrows the scope of the Commission’s
interpretation of the duty to deal found in such earlier decisions as
London European/Sabena, a decision which future jurisprudence will
have to clarify.186
C. The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine in the United
States
1. The Essential Facilities Doctrine After Aspen Skiing
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a thorough
understanding of the development of the essential facilities doctrine
in the U.S.187 A brief reference to United States v. Terminal
183

Id. at II-3228, ¶ 221.
Id. at II-3225, ¶¶ 212-13.
185
Id. at II-3223, ¶¶ 207-08.
186
Commission Decision No. 88/589/EEC, O.J. (L 317) 47 (London European-Sabena).
The Commission condemned Sabena’s refusal to grant London European access to its
computerized reservation system. Id. The Commission found that Sabena enjoyed a
dominant position in the Belgium market for computerized reservation systems and that
access to these systems was of “capital importance for all companies seeking to operate
competitively in the Belgium market.” Id. at ¶ 26. Some commentators have suggested that
this case was wrongly decided since the Commission did not look at Sabena’s position in
the airlines’ market to determine whether the potential exclusion of London European from
this market would have had any significant impact or harm in the relevant market. See Venit
& Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 333.
187
For a thorough and recent outline of this development consult Abbott B. Lipsky & J.
184
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Railroad Association188 and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States189
cases shed light on the development of the doctrine in the U.S.
Although the actual expression “essential facilities” does not appear
in any reported judicial decision until 1977,190 the doctrine originated
in Terminal Railroad—a case brought under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.191 Six railroads formed the Terminal Railroad
Association (the “Association”).192 The Association acquired,
among other facilities, the bridge connecting St. Louis with the other
side of the Mississippi River.193 The bridge was essential for railroad
companies terminating on either side of the river.194 Contrary to
arguments proffered by federal antitrust authorities, the Supreme
Court did not dissolve the Association, but ordered it to either open
membership to all railroads or grant non-members reasonable access
to the bridge.195 While not a refusal to deal case, Terminal Railroad
concerned the anticompetitive effects of the agreement among the six
railroads and the group’s actual monopolization of the bridge.196
Otter Tail represents the high-water mark of the essential facilities
doctrine in the U.S. and courts frequently quote from it. The case
marks the first time that the Supreme Court confronted the essential
facilities doctrine in the context of a refusal to deal.197 Otter Tail
held a regulated monopoly for electric power distribution in the
upper Midwest, and also distributed electricity at the retail level in
four-hundred and sixty-five towns.198 Several communities supplied
by Otter Tail built their own generation facilities and sought to
establish their own grid by obtaining power from Otter Tail at
Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999).
188
224 U.S. 383 (1912).
189
410 U.S. 366 (1973).
190
Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 187, at 1194.
191
J. GIFFORD & LEO J. RASKIND, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW CASES & MATERIALS 393
(1998).
192
Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 391.
193
Id. at 391-92.
194
Id. at 392-93.
195
Id. at 409-11.
196
Id. at 410.
197
James C. Burling, William F. Lee & Anita K. Krug, The Antitrust Duty to Deal and
Intellectual Property Rights, 24 J. CORP. L. 527, 530 (1999).
198
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973).
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wholesale rates.199 Otter Tail refused to supply wholesale power to
these communities and it sought to prevent them from gaining access
to alternative suppliers.200 The U.S. Department of Justice (the
“DOJ”) sued Otter Tail alleging monopolization of the retail power
market by unlawful use of its monopoly power in the electricity
transmission market.201 The Supreme Court ruled that Otter Tail had
violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act and confirmed the order of the
District Court requiring Otter Tail to supply wholesale power to the
communities.202
Following Otter Tail, the essential facilities doctrine enjoyed a
growing popularity as many firms relied on it despite its impractical
nature.203 This was the situation until Aspen Skiing,204 in which the
Supreme Court confined the doctrine to far more limited
situations.205 Aspen Skiing dealt with the refusal by Aspen Skiing,
the owner of three ski resorts in Aspen, Colorado to continue to
jointly market an “all-Aspen ticket program” together with the owner
of the fourth resort, Aspen Highlands.206 This program afforded
skiers the opportunity to access four skiing resorts with a single
ticket.207
The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict that Aspen Skiing
monopolized the Aspen ski market on two grounds.208 First, the
Tenth Circuit held that the all-ticket scheme was an essential
facility.209 Second, it found sufficient evidence to support the claim
that Aspen Skiing intended to drive Aspen Highlands out of the

199

Id.
Id. at 371.
201
Id. at 368-69.
202
Id.
203
See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 187, at 1192.
204
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); see
also Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 187, at 1206 (commenting on the significance of Aspen in
the development of Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
205
Herbert Hovenkamp, Intellectual Property Rights and Federal Antitrust Policy,
Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 477, 481 (1999).
206
Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 589.
207
Id. at 589.
208
Id. at 599.
209
Id.
200
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market.210 The Tenth Circuit considered Aspen Skiing’s purported
business justification invalid.211 Aspen Skiing’s dismissive treatment
of alternative ways of making Aspen Highlands’ tickets compatible
with Aspen Skiing tickets also influenced the Circuit Court’s
decision.212 The Supreme Court found that Aspen Skiing had
monopoly power and maintained such monopoly power through
exclusionary acts.213 Yet, despite confirming the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found application of the
essential facilities doctrine unnecessary.214
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Aspen Skiing established that a
refusal to deal by a monopolist violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act
when such refusal produces an important change in a pattern of
distribution that cannot be justified by normal business purposes.215
By ignoring the essential facilities doctrine, the Supreme Court
rejected it as the controlling law in unilateral refusal to deal cases
and thereby endorsed the application of traditional Section 2
principles to such cases.216 Since Aspen Skiing, some courts have
been reluctant to apply the essential facilities doctrine when the
alleged anti-competitive conduct may be assessed as monopolization
or attempt to monopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.217
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc. (“Kodak
I”),218 after rejecting respondents’ argument that the essential
facilities doctrine was the controlling law in unilateral refusals to
deal, the Ninth Circuit relied on Aspen Skiing and held that Section 2
of the Sherman Act prohibits a monopolist from refusing to deal in
210

Id. at 599.
Id.
212
Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 599.
213
See id.
214
Id. at 611, n. 44.
215
Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak
Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 503 (1999).
216
Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 600-05.
217
See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991); McKenzie
v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988); Soap Opera Now, Inc. v. Network Publ’g
Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1338 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Trans. Inc.,
924 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1991); Illinois ex rel & Burris v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 935
F.2d 1489 (7th Cir. 1991).
218
504 U.S. 451 (1992).
211
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order to create or maintain a monopoly absent a legitimate business
justification.219 The Ninth Circuit emphasized the change of pattern
effect to find Kodak in violation of Section 2 for refusing to continue
to sell replacement parts to independent service providers.220
The same reasoning may be found implicitly in Intergraph Corp.
v. Intel Corp.,221 in which Intel was found guilty of a Section 2
violation for refusing to continue licensing to one of its customers
secret business information regarding its new products.222 On
appeal, the Intel court refused to apply the essential facilities doctrine
to a refusal by a supplier to provide secret technical information to
one of its customers.223 The court found that the plaintiff and the
defendant were not competitors in any of the relevant markets and,
contrary to the plaintiff’s submission, considered the presence of a
competitive relationship a prerequisite to invoking the essential
facilities doctrine under the Sherman Act.224
2. The Main Differences between the United States and the
European Union Systems
The essential facilities doctrine has received a more structured
analysis in the U.S. than in the EU. U.S. courts have set forth a fourpart test to determine whether a refusal to deal involving an essential
facility constitutes an illegal monopolization contrary to Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. In MCI Communications Corp. v AT&T,225 the
court established the following as elements of the test: (i) control of
219

Id. at 460-61; see also Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1211.
Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1211; see also PSI Repair Servs. Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104
F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 1997). (contributing to Aspen Skiing and Kodak II the rule that a
monopolist is allowed to make a blanket refusal to deal to its potential competitors provided
that the defendant has not changed its commercial policy after locking-in some of its
customers).
221
3 F. Supp.2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
222
Id. at 1279. The district court decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
On remand the district court granted Intel’s motion for summary judgment. See Intergraph
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
223
Intel, 195 F.3d at 1356-57.
224
Id.
225
708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
220

BACHES OPI.PP6

440

3/22/01 4:30 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.11:409

an essential facility by a monopolist; (ii) competitor’s inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (iii)
refusal to grant access to the facility, and; (iv) the feasibility of
providing the facility.226 Although neither the EC courts nor the
Commission have established a similar four-part test, these elements
are implicitly incorporated in the reasoning of the EC courts and of
the Commission when they deal with an essential facilities case.227
While the concept of essential facility is similar on both sides of
the Atlantic, significant differences exist between the approaches
taken by antitrust authorities towards the essential facilities doctrine.
These differences are significant enough to merit the attention of an
in-house counsel or an attorney advising a U.S. or EU firm on the
circumstances under which it can lawfully refuse to license to actual
or potential competitors. In particular, legal practitioners must take
into account factors such as whether the owner of the facility and the
competitor to whom access is refused compete in the downstream
market or whether the justification for the refusal to license is going
to be accepted by both competition authorities.228
The first significant difference between both regimes is that, as the
Intel case229 shows, the application of the essential facilities doctrine
by U.S. courts appears to be limited, at least in monopoly leveraging
cases, to those situations where the party controlling the essential
facility has market power in a downstream market.230 In contrast, in
the EU, possession of market power in the downstream market,
despite being relevant, is not an essential element for reliance on the
essential facilities doctrine.231 This divergent treatment may be
226
Id.; Kobak, supra note 69, at 522-23; Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 323-24
(referring to an analysis of these elements in Norman W. Hawker, Open Windows: The
Essential Facilities Doctrine and Microsoft, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 115, 120-21 (1999)).
227
E.g., Joined Cases 6 & 7/73R, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA et Commercial
Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 0357; Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co
KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791,
[1998] 36 C.M.L.R. 1289 (1999); Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94 & T-388/94, European
Night Servs. Ltd and Other, v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. II-3141 (1998).
228
See Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 334, 344.
229
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
230
Alaska Airlines v. United States, 948 F.2d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 1991).
231
Lang, supra note 18, at 478; see also Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 333.
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explained by the fact that Article 82 imposes broader duties to deal
on dominant companies than Section 2 of the Sherman Act.232 In his
opinion in the Oscar Bronner case, Advocate General Jacobs
summed up the actual state of EC competition law in this area as
follows:
[A] dominant undertaking commits an abuse where,
without justification, it cuts off supplies of goods or
services to an existing customer or eliminates competition
on a related market by tying separate goods and services.
However, it also seems that an abuse may consist in a
mere refusal to license where that prevents a new product
from coming on a neighboring market in competition
with the dominant undertaking’s own product on that
market.233
It is also considered easier to generate a business justification for a
refusal to deal in the U.S. than in the EU.234 U.S. courts accept
business justifications based on technical, commercial or efficiency
grounds as legitimate reasons for refusing access to an essential
facility.235 In contrast, the jurisprudence of the EC Courts and the
case law of the Commission provide little guidance as to what types
of business justifications constitute legitimate defenses.236 Despite
the foregoing, case law suggests that EC courts and antitrust officials
would favorably consider common defenses relied upon by
232

Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 333. Stating that:
In the United States the essential facility doctrine focuses on effects in markets where a firm
holds market power subject to control under Section 2. The Article 86 [now Article 82]
cases, in contrast, appear to apply the concept in a monopoly leveraging context without
extensive consideration of the extent to which the dominant firms holds a dominant position
in the downstream market.
Id.
233
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, I-7806 ¶ 43, [1998] 36 C.M.L.R.
1289 (1999).
234
See Lang, supra note 18, at 478.
235
See, e.g., Oahu Gas Serv. Inc. v. Pacific Res., Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 368 (9th Cir. 1988)
(a monopolist refusal - in this case the sole producer of propane gas in Hawaii - to aid a
competitor was not found in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act because the
investment required of the defendant to expand production to accommodate the entry of the
competitor would have resulted in a negative return).
236
Venit & Kallaugher, supra note 19, at 317; Lang, supra note 18, at 522.
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companies controlling essential facilities before U.S. courts.237 Such
defenses range from taking advantage of economies of scale, the risk
of having negative returns if access were granted, serious congestion
in the facility, or safety considerations.238
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. When Refusals to License Intellectual Property Rights and
Antitrust Law Conflict?
1. Overview
Article 82 of the EC Treaty as well as Section 2 of the Sherman
Act may only be violated if a firm possesses market or monopoly
power.239 IPRs confer a monopoly on the proprietor to the extent
that the proprietor is insulated from the competitive exploitation of
its invention.240 In the EU and U.S., however, mere ownership of an
IPR does not confer a dominant position.241 An IP owner holds a
dominant position only if sufficient substitutes of the protected
product or service in the relevant market do not exist.242 Therefore,
the tension between intellectual property and antitrust law arises in
refusal to license cases only when an IPR confers dominant power to

237

See supra note 227.
Id.
239
ESTEVA & RYAN, supra note 98, at 119; ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC,
ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 94 (1994).
240
Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 537.
241
E.g., Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. I-6211, ¶ 8;
Joined Cases C-241/91 and C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission., 1995 E.C.R. I-743, ¶
46; Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This jurisprudence is consistent with the IP
Guidelines which state that U.S. agencies will not presume that a patent, a copyright or a
trademark necessarily confers market power upon its owner. IP Guidelines, supra note 5, at
¶ 2.2.
242
Id.
238
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its proprietor in the relevant market.243
The central question in the conflict between intellectual property
and antitrust law is whether refusals to license in an IPR context
should be treated like any case involving refusal to deal by a
dominant firm.244 The answer to this question raises a number of
policy issues. These issues concern the difficult task of balancing
interests, like the full exploitation of IPRs to generate new
technology in an ever-increasing competitive market, and the need to
preserve free competition in the market.245 These objectives are
often in conflict with one another.246 Strict adherence to antitrust
policy may discourage future investments in innovation, leading to a
loss of competitiveness of local industry in a global economy,
especially in strategic economic sectors such as pharmaceuticals,
aircrafts, or computer software.247 On the other hand, granting
immunity to IPR holders from antitrust laws may lead to
unreasonable levels of monopoly power.248
2. Theories Proposed to Solve the Intellectual Property
Law/Antitrust Law Conflict
Different theories have been construed to answer the question
posed in the previous section. These theories reflect different
approaches used to achieve an optimal balance between intellectual
property and antitrust laws. One approach advocates granting
companies antitrust immunity for the use of IPRs.249 Because
intellectual property law expressly authorizes refusal to license IPRs,
a company’s decision not to license its IPRs should be immune from
antitrust liability.250 The traditional misuse doctrine would provide
the only exception to this antitrust immunity for refusals to license
243

See Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 535.
Id. at 528; SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations
omitted).
245
See GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 191, at 677.
246
See Richard C. Levin, Patents in Perspective, 53 ANTITRUST 519, 522 (1984).
247
GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 191, at 677-78.
248
See GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra note 191, at 677.
249
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 188-97.
250
Id. at 189-90.
244
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IPRs.251 The advocates of this view argue that antitrust laws threaten
the efficiency of the economic incentives IPRs afford.252 By
granting the power to exclude others, legislators have assumed that
no antitrust violation can occur. The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit endorses this approach.253
A second school of thought believes that the “antitrust-immunity
approach” is flawed.254 It is undisputed that the aim of IPRs is to
encourage and reward innovation.255 However, pro-competition
proponents claim that the right to recover research and development
(“R&D”) investments and obtain a reward should not be
boundless.256 Many situations exist where the exercise of IPRs
stands to produce anti-competitive effects in the market important
enough to outweigh the benefits that arise from the antitrust
immunity granted to IPRs.257 Excluding a competitor by denying
access to a patent might allow sellers to raise their product’s price by
X amount, but compulsory licensing might deprive consumers of Y
efficiencies per unit.258 Therefore, a full evaluation of gains and lost
efficiencies is required.259
This second approach attempts to reconcile intellectual property
law with antitrust law by limiting the application of antitrust law to
refusals to license IPRs to exceptional circumstances. In the U.S.,
federal agencies and the Ninth Circuit have endorsed this view.260
251
See Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 533; In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust
Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1139-40, aff’d, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
252
In re Indep. Serv. Org, 989 F. Supp. at 1135-36.
253
Id.
254
See Mark R. Patterson, When is Property Intellectual?: The Leveraging Problem, 73
S. CAL. L. REV. 1133.
255
Id.
256
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1818 (1984).
257
See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE & ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 660 (3rd ed. 1990) (discussing how misallocation of resources is a social
harm of monopoly power).
258
Kaplow, supra note 256, at 1819.
259
See Pitofsky, supra note 88, at 139.
260
According to R. Pitofsky, “a cautious approach is called [for the application of
antitrust laws to high-tech industries]. But abandoning antitrust principles in this growing
and increasingly important sector of the economy seems like the wrong direction to go.”
Id.; see also Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of
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The IP Guidelines embody the principle that, for the purpose of
antitrust analysis, federal agencies regard intellectual property as
akin to any other form of property.261 The Commission and the EC
Courts have taken similar positions.262 Several theories have given
life to this second approach.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit has followed this approach by
holding that the desire of an IP holder to exclude others from its
intellectual property is a presumptively valid justification for
leveraging.263
The Ninth Circuit adopted the “presumption
approach” because it was concerned with the negative effects on
innovation of widening the standard of antitrust liability to include
some unilateral practices regarding the use of IPRs.264 Alternatively,
Professor Kaplows argues that since the ultimate question to be
answered relates to the proper incentives for IP owners or potential
IP holders, the ideal method to determine whether an IP owner has
infringed antitrust law is to analyze each alleged misconduct under a
ratio test.265 Such a test compares the patentee’s reward with the

Antitrust
and
Intellectual
Property,
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/000615speech.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001)
(concerning a speech delivered before the American Antitrust Institute Conference: An
Agenda for Antitrust in the 21st Century on June 15, 2000).
261
See IP Guidelines, supra note 5, at ¶ 2.1.
262
See GOYDER supra note 67, at 351-59.
263
Kodak II, 125 F.3 at 1211.
264
Id. Unilateral conduct is the most common conduct in the economy. Id. After
Kodak II, unilateral conduct by a manufacturer in its own aftermarkets may give rise to
liability and, in one-brand markets, monopoly power created by patents and copyrights will
frequently be found. Id. Under current law the successful defense of monopolization claims
will rest largely on the legitimacy of the asserted business justifications, as evidenced by the
jury instructions approved in Aspen Skiing. Id. As the Kodak II court stated:
Without bounds, claims based on unilateral conduct will proliferate. The
history of this case demonstrates that such claims rest on highly disputed
factual questions regarding market definition. Particularly where treble
damages are possible, such claims will detract from the advantages lawfully
granted to the holders of patents or copyrights by subjecting them to the cost
and risk of lawsuits based upon the effect, on an arguably separate market, of
their refusal to sell or license. The cost of such suits will reduce a patent
holder’s “incentive . . . to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time,
research, and development.”
Id. at 1218 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)).
265
Kaplow supra note 256 at 1842.
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monopoly loss imposed on society.266
The antitrust immunity approach and the approach adopted by the
Ninth Circuit have been criticized as too simplistic.267 According to
some authors, these approaches fail to make a real attempt to
determine the proper balance between the social benefits that stem
from the creation of intellectual property and the social cost of
monopoly overcharges.268 The antitrust-immunity approach avoids
this dilemma by overlooking the need to keep a proper balance
between the main interests of intellectual property law (ensuring a
proper reward to IP holders in order to encourage innovation) and the
public interest of enhancing free competition.269 In other words, this
approach overlooks the fact that IPRs grant a privilege serving a
public purpose.270 Intellectual property law grants monopolies in
order to provide an incentive for the creation of inventions.271 These
monopolies are limited, because the goal of the law is to create the
incentive while imposing no higher a monopoly cost than is

266

Id.
See Patterson, supra note 254, at 1140.
268
Kaplow, supra note 256, at 1845-49; Patterson, supra note 254, at 1138-39.
269
See supra note 268.
270
Patterson, supra note 254, at 1139; see also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv.
Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944).
271
See e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 112 (1994) (concerning patent law where statute requires
that the invention be novel and described with sufficient particularity to allow others to
make and use the invention); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)
(discussing requirements for patentability); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 135 (1997) (“Patent law provides a marketdriven incentive to invest in innovation by allowing the investor to appropriate the full
economic rewards of her invention.”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors
to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[T]he limited grant is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to
the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”);
William W. Fisher, III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1687 (1988) (“[T]he elaborate combination of grants and reservations that comprise the
Copyright Act is designed to advance the public welfare by rewarding creative intellectual
effort sufficiently to encourage talented people to engage in it, while at the same time
making the fruits of their genius accessible to as many people as possible as quickly and as
cheaply as possible.”).
267
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necessary.272
The second approach, whether it adopts the Kodak II presumption
or Kaplows’ proposal, is not without its faults. The presumption
approach has been criticized for failing to calculate the incentives
necessary to encourage innovation.273 While the Kaplow ratio test
may resolve this issue, it proves difficult to apply in practice.274 The
balance between gains and losses required under Kaplow’s ratio test
could force courts and administrative agencies to perform an
inappropriate function for which they may lack expertise and
appropriate information.275 Courts and antitrust authorities may
miscalculate the efficiencies of granting or not granting compulsory
access.276 Neither the case law nor independent economic analysis
has articulated workable quantitative criteria to correctly calibrate the
incentives to induce an optimal amount of innovation.277
The issues posed by the tension between innovation incentives and
optimal deterrence can be grappled with in two ways. The Kodak II
court’s focus on intent278 serves as one alternative. As explained in
Section 4(D)(2)(a) below, the Ninth Circuit held that Kodak’s
business justifications for its refusal to license its replacement parts
to independent service organizations was pretextual.279 The court
based its conclusion on the testimony of Kodak’s parts manager who
declared that patents “did not cross his mind” when Kodak instituted
a policy of refusing to sell parts to independent repairers.280 The
Kodak II court’s subjective test has the advantage of avoiding the
delicate task of economic balancing when deciding whether
intellectual property drives the refusal to license the replacement

272

Patterson, supra note 254, at 1139.
Id. at 1140.
274
Id. at 1139.
275
See Kaplow, supra note 256, at 1833.
276
See id.
277
Marino Lao, Unilateral Refusal to Sell or License Intellectual Property & Antitrust
Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J. L. PUB. POL’Y. 193, 214-15 (1999); GIFFORD & RASKIND, supra
note 191, at 676; Patterson, supra note 254, at 1139.
278
Kodak II., 125 F.3d at 1219-20.
279
Id.
280
Id. at 1218-20.
273
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parts.281 Unfortunately, the court’s inquiry into the subjective
motivation of IP holders undermines the advantage gained by
foregoing economic balancing. As explained section 4(D)(2)(a)
below, the IP holder’s subjective motivation is always difficult to
determine.282
Professor Patterson of Fordham University School of Law has
recently proposed an interesting and thoughtful theory to circumvent
the difficult economic balancing which the second approach requires.
Patterson’s proposal is based on the idea that patents and copyrights
protect inventions and expression, not products.283 Thus, intellectual
property law should only provide special protection when the owner
of the rights truly denies access to its intellectual property.284 This
occurs only when the one who will “use” the IP is deprived of its
use.285 According to Patterson, an independent service provider who
seeks access to the owner’s protected parts in order to install them in
the equipment of others cannot be deemed willing to “use” the
owner’s IP.286 Therefore, an owner’s refusal cannot be justified on
the grounds that the invention embodied in its products has patent
protection.287
This use-oriented approach, like the Kodak II approach, avoids the
economic balancing between the fair return to the IP holder and the
social loss that awarding an IP monopoly presents.288 Professor
Patterson’s theory has two advantages over the Kodak II approach.
First, by focusing on “actual business practice,” rather than “intent”
it avoids the uncertainty that the Kodak II court’s reasoning
introduces by relying on the IP owner’s subjective intent.289 Second,
281

Patterson, supra note 254, at 1139-41.
Id. at 1141.
283
Id. at 1134.
284
Id. at 1135.
285
Id. Notice though, that as Professor Patterson acknowledges, the problem is that it is
not always possible to make use of the underlying ideas in a copyrighted work without also
copying the work’s protected expression. Id. Professor Patterson indicates that U.S. courts
have tried to solve this problem by applying the fair use doctrine. Id. at 1154.
286
Id. at 1136.
287
Patterson, supra note 254, at 1135.
288
Id. at 1141.
289
Id.
282
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by focusing on the party to whom access is denied, instead of the
owner of the intellectual property, the proposal better ensures that the
return on IP relates to its value.290
The drawback of Patterson’s approach concerns the difficulty in
determining the potential licensee’s true intentions: does the potential
licensee desire to “use” the patent or the product wherein the patent
is embedded? Moreover, the success of such an approach remains
unknown. Unlike the other approaches discussed above, U.S. courts
have yet to adopt it. The validity of this approach lies in an
expansive interpretation of the Patent Act. Section 271 of the Patent
Act291 grants the patent holder the right to “exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States.”292 As Patterson points out, a service organization that buys
and installs a part that incorporates a patented invention does not
“make” the invention.293 Likewise, the service organization would
not “use” the invention if the invention does not play a role in the
product’s installation.294
Questions remain as to the extent to which the service organization
actually uses the invention when it resides in the part. The reward of
the owner probably depends not on the sales of the invention (in this
case a market for the invention as such existed), but on the sales of
the replacement part.295 Finally, one cannot argue that the service
organization does not “sell” the invention. Patterson tries to
overcome this difficulty by arguing the following: if what the
organization offers for sale is its service, in which parts are included,
but does not sell the manufacturer’s parts independently of that
service, “it seems that a reasonable argument can be made that it
does not sell the parts.”296 The success of this interpretation remains
uncertain.

290
291
292
293
294
295
296

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
Id.
Patterson, supra note 254, at 1149-50.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1149.
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How Patterson’s theory solves the issue of the proper incentives
needed to maintain an optimal level of innovation remains
unanswered. The success of this approach hinges on a presumption
that the incentive provided by intellectual property laws to innovate,
represented by the right to exclude others from the “invention”
(without then including within the scope of the IP the right to
exclude others from making or selling the product in which the
invention is embodied), is sufficient to stimulate the creation and
dissemination of ideas. Yet, precisely because the amount of
incentive needed for optimal creativity remains unknown, one can
reasonably argue that the right of IP holders to refuse to license
products in which their inventions are embodied should be limited
only to exceptional circumstances. Any legal rule, either based on
the essential facilities doctrine or the leveraging theory, that may
decrease the value of IPRs by limiting or qualifying an IP owner’s
right to the exclusive use of its own property, risks drastically
reducing the incentive to innovate.297
The ECJ seems to follow an approach similar to that of Professor
Patterson.298 In Volvo AB v. Erik Veng, the ECJ held that Volvo’s
refusal to license to an independent repairer its design rights for the
front wing of its “Series 200” automobiles did not amount to an
abuse of dominant position under Article 82 of the EC Treaty.299
However, the ECJ did hold that Volvo could not arbitrarily refuse to
supply its wing panels to independent repairers.300 The ECJ’s
holding relies on the idea that an arbitrary refusal to sell replacement
parts cannot be justified by a concern for protecting Volvo’s IPR on
its wing panels.301 In other words, the independent repairers in
Volvo, like the independent service providers in Kodak II and Xerox,
did not want to “use” Volvo’s design rights, but only offered a repair
service for which the wing panels were required.302

297

Ronald W. Davis, The FTC’s Intel Case: What Are the Limitations on “Throwing
Your Weight Around?” Using Intellectual Property Rights?, 13 ANTITRUST 47, 47 (1999).
298
Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. I-6211.
299
Id. at 6236.
300
Id. at 6235.
301
See id. at 6235, ¶ 8-9.
302
See id. at 6235, ¶ 9, 6224, ¶ 6-11.
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The second approach, despite rejecting the pro-immunity
approach, endorses the widely-held view that antitrust authorities and
courts should take a more cautious approach in refusal-to-deal
situations involving IPRs than other goods or services.303 Unlike
conventional goods or services, IPRs form a legitimate basis for
exclusivity because IPRs bear an inherent right to exclude others.304
IPRs raise special concerns because limiting their exercise based on
antitrust remedies may have the opposite effect of the desired goal of
opening up markets. Consequently, access to IPRs owned by a
dominant firm, under this second view, should be granted on much
narrower grounds than the granting of access to mere goods,
infrastructures or services.
B. Inroads on the Traditional Approach
Under EU and U.S. law, the general rule is that an intellectual
property owner with a dominant position is under no obligation to
license its IPRs.305 Otherwise, the owner would be deprived of the
substance of its rights if it were obliged to grant a license every time
a person requested one and offered to pay a reasonable royalty.306
Nonetheless, in recent years, significant inroads to this general rule
have emerged that have generated legal uncertainty for dominant IP
owners who refuse to license their IPRs.307

303

See Pitofsky, supra note 260.
See Case 238/87, Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. at 6235.
305
E.g., Case 238/87, Volvo AB v. Erik Veng (U.K.) Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 6211; Case T69/89, RTE v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-114; Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP
v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-743. In the U.S., refer to the U.S. IP Guidelines, supra note
5, at ¶ 2.2.
306
Case 238/87, Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. at 6235, ¶ 8.
307
See Kobak, supra note 69, at 534; see also J.T. Westermeier, Interoperability,
Standards, Intellectual Property and Antitrust, 566 PLI/PAT 235, 240 (1999); Charles L.
Freed, Antitrust and the Duty to License Intellectual Property -– Can Manufacturers Be
Compelled to Deal with ISOs?, 14 ANTITRUST 33, 37 (1999).
304
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C. The Application in the European Union of the Essential
Facilities Doctrine to Refusals to License
1. The Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice Prior to
Magill
Before Magill,308, the landmark decision in this field was Volvo.309
Volvo held a U.K. registered design for the front wing panels of
Volvo Series 200 cars.310 Without Volvo’s authorization, Veng
imported imitations of Volvo’s wing panels into the U.K. from other
Member States.311 Volvo sought to prevent Veng from importing
and marketing them in the U.K.312
Volvo refused to license its design rights, despite Veng’s
willingness to pay a reasonable royalty.313 A British Court requested
a preliminary ruling from the ECJ that would guide its decision
whether this refusal amounted to an infringement of Article 82 of the
EC Treaty.314
Following the Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, the ECJ
reasoned that the right of the proprietor of a protected design to
prevent third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing
without the proprietor’s consent products incorporating the design,
constitutes “the very subject-matter” of its exclusive right.315
Accordingly, the ECJ ruled that an obligation imposed on the
proprietor of a protected design to grant to third parties, even in
return for a reasonable royalty, a license for the production and
marketing of products incorporating the design, would deprive the
proprietor of the substance of his exclusive right.316 For this reason,
308
Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, 1995
E.C.R. I-743.
309
Case 238/87, Volvo, 1998 E.C.R. 6211.
310
Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. at 6213-14, 6233 ¶ 3.
311
Id. at 6234.
312
Id. at 6233.
313
Id. at 6234.
314
Id.
315
Id. at 6235.
316
Volvo, 1988 E.C.R. at 6235.
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a refusal to grant such a license cannot in itself constitute an abuse of
dominant position.317
In its holding, the ECJ introduced various nuances distinguishing
the refusal to license the design rights from an arbitrary refusal to
supply replacement parts.318 According to the ECJ, the “exercise” of
an exclusive right by the proprietor of a registered design with
respect to car body panels may be prohibited by Article 82 if it
involves on the part of a dominant firm, any of three types of “certain
abusive conduct:.” (i) the arbitrary refusal to supply replacement
parts to independent repairers; (ii) the fixing of prices for
replacement parts at an unfair level, or (iii) a decision to cease
production of replacement parts for a particular model when many
cars of that model are still circulating.319 The Volvo case is
significant since the ECJ accepted that it is possible, under Article
82, to interfere with rights falling within the specific subject matter
of an IPR. The ECJ further elaborated on the Volvo doctrine in
Magill.320
2. The Impact of Magill on Refusals to License Intellectual
Property Rights
After Volvo, legal uncertainty surrounded the question of whether
the owner of an exclusive right in a dominant market position should
be required to license its IPRs to third parties when the owner, apart
from refusing to grant the license, has committed no acts that would
demand antitrust scrutiny.321 In Volvo, the ECJ identified three
317

Id.
Id.
319
Id.
320
Case T-69/89, RTE v. Commission., 1991 E.C.R. II-485 (1991); Case T-70/89, BBC
v. Commission. 1991 E.C.R. II-535 (1991); Case T-76/89, ITP Ltd. v. Commission., 1991
E.C.R. II-575 (1991); Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP v. Commission., 1995
E.C.R. I-743 (1995).
321
Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-764. A comment by
Professor Korah regarding paragraph 9 of Volvo reflects the vagueness of the judgment: “It
seems then that the proprietor of an exclusive right, who is held to enjoy a dominant
position, may be required either to license third parties, or to supply them with the protected
product on terms which are not ‘unfair,’ whatever that may mean.” (emphasis added).
KORAH, supra note 42, at 257; see also Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill, The
318
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circumstances in which a firm’s refusal to license its IPRs to a third
party may constitute an abuse of dominant position.322 The ECJ,
however, failed to indicate whether a refusal to license in other
circumstances could also constitute an abuse of dominant position.323
In Magill, the ECJ held that under certain “exceptional
circumstances,” simply by refusing to license its IPRs to a third
party, a dominant firm could violate Article 82.324 This theoretical
legal exposure could compel dominant firms to always grant license
requests.325 Dominant firms find Magill troubling because it fails to
define what “exceptional circumstances” would warrant the granting
of access to IPRs.326 Magill provides paltry guidance in this
respect.327
In Magill, three television stations (RTE, ITV and BBC)
broadcasting in Ireland and Northern Ireland (U.K.) refused to
license their copyright on the information contained in their
respective program listings to the Irish publisher Magill TV Guide
Ltd. (“Magill”).328
Magill briefly attempted to publish a
comprehensive weekly television guide that competed with the
broadcasters’ guides.329 The three broadcasters relied on their
copyrights and obtained injunctions in the Irish courts to restrain
Magill from publishing the guide.330 In 1986, Magill lodged a
complaint with the Commission against the three broadcasters’
refusal to license their copyrights.331
In 1988, the Commission condemned the three broadcasters for
abusing their dominant positions by preventing the publication and
sale of a comprehensive weekly TV guide in Ireland and Northern

Judgment of the ECJ, 17 E.I.P.R. 297, 301 (1995).
322
Vinje supra note 321, at 301.
323
Id. at 323.
324
Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-744-45, ¶ 3.
325
See Vinje, supra note 321, at 301.
326
Id.
327
See id.
328
Case T-69/89, RTE v. Commission., 1991 E.C.R. II-485, 494, ¶¶ 7-10 (1991).
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Id. at II-495, ¶ 11.
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Ireland.332 The three broadcasters were forced to grant Magill a
copyright license.333 The broadcasters appealed the decision, but the
CFI upheld it.334 RTE and ITV subsequently appealed the judgment
of the CFI before the ECJ.335 The ECJ affirmed the CFI’s holding,
but declined to endorse its reasoning.336
The CFI based its ruling on the distinction between the “existence”
and the “exercise” of an intellectual property right.337 The CFI
developed this distinction by balancing the principle of free
movement of goods within the common market against the
protection of IPRs.338
The CFI transposed aspects of this
jurisprudence to Article 82 cases.339 The CFI found that even though
a refusal to license is not in itself an abuse, this lack of liability
vanishes when the right is exercised to pursue an aim manifestly
contrary to the objectives of Article 82.340 The CFI found that the
broadcaster, RTE, prevented the production and marketing of a new
product - a comprehensive weekly TV guide - for which there was
consumer demand.341 The CFI opined that RTE acted to ensure its
monopoly in the market of weekly TV guides.342 In so doing, the
CFI held that RTE went beyond the scope of its copyright, because it
332

Id. at II-491, ¶ 1.
Id.; Commission. Decision 89/205/EEC, art. 1-2, 1989 O.J. (L 78) 43.
334
Case T-69/89, RTE, 1991 E.C.R. at II-496, ¶ 13.
335
Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP v. Commission., 1995 E.C.R. I-743
(1995).
336
Id. at 825, ¶ 58.
337
Case T-69/89, RTE, 1991 E.C.R. at II-510, ¶ 46.
338
Id. at II-518, ¶ 67, II-522-23, ¶¶ 76-77.
339
Rosa Greaves, Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission. of the European
Communities, 4 EUR. COMP. L.R. 244, 247 (1995). See also KORAH, supra note 42, at 21718. In criticizing the distinction between the “existence” of rights and their “exercise”
Korah states:
In legal theory, it is impossible to draw the line between the existence and the
exercise, except at the extremes. Analytically, the existence of a right consists
of all the ways in which it may be exercised. In ruling that an important
difference rests on a distinction which cannot be drawn by logical analysis, the
Court created a very flexible instrument for it to develop the law and reduce the
value of intellectual property.
Id.
340
Case T-69/89, RTE, 1991 E.C.R. at II-519, ¶ 71.
341
Id. at II-507-08, ¶¶ 41-42.
342
Id. at II-510, ¶ 46.
333
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had pursued an aim “manifestly contrary to the objectives of Article
86 [now Article 82].”343
The problem with this approach is that a strict application of the
existence/exercise doctrine to refusal to license cases could lead to a
solution incompatible with the fundamental nature of IPRs.344
Article 30 of the EC Treaty allows an organization with an IPR to
derogate from the provisions on free movement of goods to protect
industrial and commercial property, provided such derogation does
not constitute arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
community trade.345 Since the very aim of an IPR is to give the
owner the option of restricting competition,346 it would be difficult to
determine when a refusal to license does not constitute a “disguised
restriction of competition” within the meaning of Article 30 of the
EC Treaty.347
Perhaps, because the ECJ was aware of the shortcomings of the
existence/exercise doctrine when applied to refusals to license IPRs,
it instead followed a different line of reasoning.348 The ECJ
confirmed that mere ownership of an intellectual property right does
not confer dominant position.349 Yet since each of the broadcasters
enjoyed a monopoly over the information contained in its program
listings, each also held a dominant position over that information.350
With regard to actual abuse, the ECJ rejected the appellants’
argument that a company is immune from antitrust laws when it
exercises its copyright.351 In Magill, unlike in Volvo, the ECJ did not
rely on the distinction between the “existence” and the “exercise” of
Instead, the ECJ focused on whether there were
IPRs.352
343

Id. at II-520-21, ¶ 73.
See Vinje, supra note 321, at 300-01.
345
Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP v. Commission., 1995 E.C.R. I-743, I816, ¶ 25 (1995).
346
Id. at I-767, ¶ 67.
347
Marleen Van Kerckhove, Magill: A Refusal to License or a Refusal to Supply, 416
PLI/PAT 997, 1003 (1995).
348
Vinje, supra note 307, at 297.
349
Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-822, ¶ 46.
350
Id. at ¶ 47.
351
Id. at ¶ 48.
352
Vinje, supra note 321, at 300-01.
344
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“exceptional circumstances” rendering the broadcasters’ refusal to
supply the copyrighted information a violation of Article 82.353
Contrary to the Opinion of the Advocate General,354 the ECJ found
exceptional circumstances, and ruled that the broadcasters had
abused their dominant position by relying on their copyrights in
refusing to supply Magill with the basic information regarding their
The ECJ pointed to three exceptional
program listings.355
circumstances.356 First, there was no actual or potential substitute for
a weekly television guide offering information on the week’s
upcoming programs, despite a specific, constant and regular
consumer demand.357 The broadcasters’ refusal to provide basic
information (i.e., channel, day, time and title of the programs), the
“indispensable raw material”358 for compiling a weekly guide,
prevented the emergence of a new product which would have
competed with the broadcasters’ own guides.359 Second, no business
justification existed for the refusal, although the ECJ did not
thoroughly discuss this finding.360 Third, the broadcasters had
reserved for themselves a monopoly in the secondary market of
weekly television guides by excluding all competition.361
The ECJ’s judgment led to considerable disappointment for two
reasons.362 First, the ECJ confronted the CFI’s application of the
existence/exercise doctrine developed under Articles 28 and 30 of
the EC Treaty (free movement of goods) to Article 82 cases dealing
353

Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-823, ¶ 46.
Id. at I-747.
355
Id. at I-824, ¶ 54.
356
Id. at I-824, ¶¶ 52-57.
357
Id. at I-823-24, ¶ 52.
358
GOYDER, supra note 67, at 357 (describing how the ECJ was concerned specifically
with the refusal to supply information more than with a refusal to license). Compare
RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-824 with Joined Cases 6 and 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico
Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223
(concerning a reference to an indispensable raw material reminiscent of the wording used by
the ECJ in traditional refusal to deal cases like Commercial Solvents).
359
Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE/ITP, 1995 E.C.R. at I-824, ¶ 53-54.
360
Contra at I-767 (endorsing appellants’ argument that the right to refuse licenses must
be regarded as necessary in order to guarantee the copyright owner the reward for his
creative effort).
361
Id. at I-824, ¶ 50.
362
GOYDER, supra note 67, at 357; Greaves, supra note 339, at 246.
354
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with refusals to license.363 Second, the ECJ failed to enunciate a
clear legal doctrine for refusals to license IPRs.364 The Magill
decision fails to address the question of when a product is considered
sufficiently new to trigger the application of the judgment.365
Perhaps the ECJ’s failure to establish a clear doctrine for refusals to
license reflects an unwillingness to confine itself doctrinally, as
happened in the wake of Volvo.366 Nonetheless, the ECJ should have
addressed these issues to establish legal certainty.367
The business world viewed Magill as a radical judgment.368 The
case sparked anxiety among proprietors of IPRs, especially in the
pharmaceutical and computer/software industries.369 Firms feared
that a broad interpretation of Magill could devalue their rights.370
The pharmaceutical industry feared that a firm holding an important
patent could be forced to license its patent to other companies
seeking to manufacture the product around the world,371 or to a
holder of a major improvement.372 In this latter scenario, the patent
holder would be deprived of its right to make available a new,
improved product, severely undermining the prospective profit of the
basic patent.373
In the software industry, the Magill judgment ignited the debate
surrounding the final adoption of the EC Software Directive.374 The
EC Software Directive struck a balance between copyright protection
and competition in the information technology industry.375 However,
some commentators saw Magill as buttressing the pro-competition
363

See Greaves, supra note 339, at 247.
GOYDER, supra note 67, at 357.
365
H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It
Work in Practice?, 6 E.B.L.R. 231, 233 (1995).
366
See Vinje, supra note 321, at 301.
367
Kerckhove, supra note 347, at 1003; see also Vinje, supra note 321, at 301; see
generally GOYDER, supra note 67, at 357.
368
Vinje, supra note 321, at 302; contra Greaves, supra note 339, at 247.
369
GOYDER, supra note 67, at 359.
370
Id.
371
Id.
372
KORAH, supra note 42, at 258.
373
Id.
374
Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.
375
Vinje, supra note 321, at 302.
364
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agenda in the software industry.376 Software producers feared that the
owner of a valuable software program could be prevented from
effectively exploiting the program by being forced into widespread
licensing.377 Following Magill, the varying scholarly views about
the decision’s future impact on licensing practices show the software
producers’ fears were valid.378 The ECJ’s narrow interpretation of
Magill, however, allayed these initial fears.379
376

Id.
GOYDER, supra note 67, at 359; Vinje, supra note 321, at 302-03.
378
Compare Vinje, supra note 321, at 302 (stating “Magill is unlikely to be limited
strictly to its facts, and it will be necessary for both rightholders and their competitors to
review a whole range of conducts involving intellectual property from a new perspective.”)
with Greaves, supra note 339, at 246-47 (“[t]he formulation of the judgment is so tied up
with stressing the ‘exceptional circumstances’ of this case that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to imagine another situation where the refusal to license by a copyright owner
will be held an abuse of dominant position.”) and Lugard, supra note 365, at 232 ([t]he
conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to arrive at the conclusion that Article 86 [now
Article 82] requires a company to license its intellectual property rights are multiple and
quite strict, making the Magill doctrine difficult to apply in practice.”); see also Forrester,
supra note 47, at § 35-12.
379
See GOYDER, supra note 67, at 359; KORAH, supra note 42, at 259. The Commission
refused to apply the Magill doctrine in a complaint brought by a pay-per-view digital
platform (Via Digital) against the grant by the right holder (Audiovisual Sport) of an
exclusive license over football broadcasting rights to a competing TV digital platform
(Canal Satelite Digital). The licensee and the complainant were the only two digital
platforms in Spain. Before the exclusive license was granted, both platforms were entitled
to broadcast Spanish league football games covered by the challenged license. In 1999, the
Commission granted a three year exemption to the exclusivity under Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty, and refused to consider football broadcasting rights as an essential facility, despite
the claims from the complainant that football broadcasting rights were indispensable for the
digital platform to continue operating in the market (the Commission’s decision granting the
exemption was never published). Thereafter, however, the shareholders of each digital
platform reached an agreement to share among themselves the football broadcasting rights
of the Spanish league. Pursuant to this deal, the parties granted exclusive football
broadcasting rights to Via Digital and Canal Satelite Digital thereby excluding other pay-TV
platforms from having access to the broadcasting rights. The deal was notified to the EC
Commission, which sent the parties a statement of objections lifting the immunity from
fines normally stemming from the filing of a notification with the EC Commission. The EC
Commission threatened the parties with fines if they did not grant access to those rights to
other pay-TV platforms on the ground that successful access to the Spanish pay-TV market
relied heavily on the right to broadcast the relevant football games. In June 2000, the parties
granted access to the relevant football rights to new cable and digital terrestrial television
entrants in Spain. See IP/00/1352, Brussels, 23 November 2000. The outcome of this case
may indicate that in future cases the EC Commission will be more receptive to claims
against granting exclusive broadcasting rights based on the essential facility doctrine. See
377
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Despite the judgment’s shortcomings, Magill was rightly decided
on the merits. Moreover, the ECJ ruling in Magill is important for
two reasons. First, it reflects the tension between intellectual
property and EC competition laws.380 Second, Magill goes a step
further than Volvo in its antitrust/intellectual property analysis.381 It
was the first, and remains the only, case in which the ECJ imposed
the duty to license an IPR to prevent the infringement of EC
competition laws.382 The Magill holding is significant in that
copyright compulsory licenses under EU competition law lack
binding force in the individual member states.383 One may speculate
that the ECJ opted not to express the true basis for its Magill decision
out of concern that it would conflict with the national copyright laws
of the different member states.384
ECJ judges view Irish and U.K. copyright legislation with
disfavor.385 While copyright laws are designed to encourage, protect,
and reward creative innovation, copyrighted television listings hold
little literary merit.386 That Magill concerns the publication of
television listings explains why the holding should not extend to noncopyright IPRs.387 Enforcing compulsory licensing for television
listings does not significantly impact the production and release of
program listings.388 The incentive to produce and disseminate
programs will be the same irrespective of whether the broadcasters
are protected from competition in the television guide market.389

A.M. Wachtmeister, Broadcasting of Sports Events and Competition Law, 2 Competition
Policy Newsletter, June 1998.
380
See Vinje, supra note 321, at 297.
381
Id. at 300.
382
Id. at 298.
383
Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, RTE, ITP v. Commission., 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 748
(1995).
384
Id. at I-823 (indicating in paragraph 49 of the judgment that, in the absence of
harmonization, the scope of intellectual property rights is a matter for national law).
385
See Korah, supra note 23, at 173; see also Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co
KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791,
[1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 133-34 (1999).
386
See Greaves, supra note 339, at 246.
387
Ridyard, supra note 91, at 446.
388
Id.
389
Id.
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Unlike television listings, however, the compulsory licensing of
economically useful intellectual property discourages firms from
committing resources to innovation.390 For this reason, other
commentators welcomed the ECJ’s use of the “circumstance-based
approach.”391 This novel approach marked the demise of the
existence/exercise doctrine as a guide to determining whether a
refusal to license runs contrary to Article 82.392 The judgment of the
CFI in Ladbroke v. Commission393 confirms this hypothesis.
Professor Korah reports that officials of the Commission’s legal
service pointed out, in their personal capacities, that Magill should be
limited to “unmeritorious kinds of intellectual property.”394
Ladbroke confirmed this view.395 In Ladbroke, the Commission and
the CFI refused to apply Magill to a situation where the undertakings
(PMI/PMU) holding the exclusive rights to televised pictures and
audio commentaries on French horse races, and an undertaking
holding the exclusive rights to market such performing rights in
Austria and Germany (DSV), refused to license the right to
retransmit such audiovisuals of French horse races to a Belgian
betting agency (Tiercé Ladbroke).396 The CFI distinguished Magill
from Ladbroke on three different grounds. First, Tiercé Ladbroke
enjoyed a dominant position in the Belgian horse races betting
services market, and did not need a license to introduce a new
product.397 Second, the license was not indispensable because
sounds and images, although helpful, are not essential to a betting
agency.398 Third, films are not indispensable since they are shown
after the bets have been placed.399
390

Korah, supra note 23, at 173; Ridyard, supra note 91, at 446.
Darren Fitzgerald, Tiercé Ladbroke AS v. The Commission, 20 E.I.P.R. 154, 160
(1998); see also Vinje, supra note 321, at 301.
392
Vinje, supra note 321, at 301.
393
Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-927 (1997).
394
VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENT AND THE EC COMPETITION
RULES 53-54 (1996).
395
Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-923.
396
Id.
397
Id. at II-969, ¶ 130.
398
Id. at II-969, ¶ 132.
399
Id.; see generally Korah, supra note 23, at 169 (providing a thorough and critical
analysis of this case).
391
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The first of these three grounds evinces the CFI’s narrow
interpretation of Magill’s “novelty” test.400 Rather than concluding
that sounds and images of French horse races were a service
ancillary to the betting market and not indispensable, the CFI could
have found that the act of relaying these sounds and images in
Belgium was itself a new product whose emergence was prevented
by the refusal to license.401 Likewise, the weakness of the third
ground could be interpreted as exemplifying the CFI’s unwillingness
to apply Magill to this case.402
In this respect, a logical
counterargument could be that bettors, knowing the images were
going to be shown after and not during the race, might still be
strongly influenced in their choice of betting agency.403 Finally,
along with the opinions of Commission officials and the outcome of
Ladbroke, the ECJ’s judgment in Oscar Bronner, narrowly
interpreting Magill and the essential facilities doctrine, also weighs
against a broad interpretation of Magill.404
The foregoing indicates that the ECJ’s holding in Magill is so
constrained by the specific facts and exceptional circumstances of
the case, that the judgment is unlikely to be successfully transposed
to other situations.405 Magill is thus not likely to be repeated.406
Some may argue that the Magill judgment is not radical.407 In fact,
the decision does not seem to have had much impact on the conduct
of copyright owners, and has not taken the evolution of EC
competition much further than Volvo,408 much less added legal
certainty in this field.
Despite the narrow interpretation given by the Commission and the
CFI to Magill, the paucity of reasoning by the ECJ in Magill and the
400

Fitzgerald, supra note 391, at 160.
Id.
402
Id. at 160-61.
403
Id. at 161.
404
E.g., Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998] 4 C.M.L.R. 112, 133-34
(1999).
405
Contra Vinje, supra note 321, at 302.
406
See Greaves, supra note 339, at 247.
407
Id.
408
Id.
401
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CFI’s failure in Ladbroke to expressly limit Magill to extreme cases
leave some unanswered questions.409 First, it is still unclear whether
the holder of an important patent, which is indispensable to a third
party seeking to introduce a new product that will compete with the
right holder’s product, may refuse to license its patent without
infringing Article 82. The reasoning of the ECJ in Magill does not
give much guidance in this respect. Yet, the narrow interpretation
given by the Commission and the CFI make it unlikely that a patent
holder or a copyright owner, in circumstances markedly different
from those in Magill, would be forced to grant a license under EC
competition law.410
Second, neither Magill nor Ladbroke shed any light on what would
happen if, in a Magill-type scenario, the defendant tried to prevent
antitrust liability by providing the new product itself.411 It seems this
should be enough to avoid the application of Article 82 to the refusal
to license, especially if the defendant can prove it had planned to
enter that market before the plaintiff requested the license.412
However, if the introduction of the product is seen as a stark reaction
to the request for the license, then the possibility cannot be ignored
that the Commission might perceive such conduct as a pretext to
exclude a new product from the market, and as such, contrary to
Article 82.

409
410
411
412

Korah, supra note 23, at 176.
See Lugard, supra note 365, at 234.
See id. at 233.
See id.
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D. The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Refusals
to License Intellectual Property in the United States
1. Overview
a. The United States Supreme Court Case Law
For many years, U.S. courts almost uniformly held that the owner
of a valid IPR that has not engaged in any form of misuse, such as
the tying of unpatented articles, price fixing over an unpatented
product, or the bringing of unjustified infringement claims does not
violate antitrust laws and, therefore, cannot be compelled by Section
2 of the Sherman Act to license its rights to a competitor.413 In
Miller Insituform v. Insituform of North America, 414 the Sixth
Circuit was asked to decide whether a licensor that had terminated an
exclusive sublicense agreement, allegedly to retake as exclusive the
territory granted to the sublicensee, could be held liable under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.415 The court distinguished a simple
refusal to license from other improper practices that may run afoul of
the Sherman Act, such as tying or illegal price fixing activities in
connection to patents.416 The court found that none of the improper
practices leading to liability under the Sherman Act were present in
the case at hand and accordingly confirmed the grant of summary
judgment for the defendant.417 The court held that a patent holder
who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2
of the Sherman Act simply by refusing to license the patent to
others.418

413

See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 188; Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note
197, at 537; Freed, supra note 307, at 33.
414
830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987).
415
Id. at 607.
416
Id. at 608.
417
Id. at 609.
418
Id.
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Similarly, in Advanced Computer Services of Michigan v. MAI
Systems,419 a district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
copyright holder MAI Systems (“MAI”), a minicomputers
manufacturer.420 Several independent service providers (“ISP”) sued
MAI for an alleged violation of Section 1 (tying its software to its
services) and Section 2 (monopolization of MAI computers’ service
market) of the Sherman Act.421 MAI had requested that the
independent service providers cease copying its computer software
used for the maintenance of MAI computers.422 The district court
held that MAI could not be held liable for monopolization because
“the enforcement of its copyrights do not constitute copyright
misuse, nor does it constitute anticompetitive conduct in violation of
§ 2 of the Sherman Act”.423
With the exception of Kodak I,424 none of the Supreme Court’s
duty-to-deal precedents involved intellectual property.425 After
Kodak I, the rule articulated in Miller Insituform, Advance Computer
Services, and other cases426 involving refusal to license patents or
copyrights came under scrutiny and was revised.427 In Kodak I,
Kodak changed its long established pattern of distribution and
refused to supply replacement parts for its copiers to independent
service providers.428 Some ISPs sued Kodak for attempting to
monopolize the service market by leveraging its dominant position in
the replacement parts market.429 Kodak filed a motion for summary
judgment that was eventually rejected by the Supreme Court.430

419

845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994).
Id. at 371.
421
Id. at 359.
422
Id. at 359-60.
423
Id. at 370.
424
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (Kodak I).
425
Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 533.
426
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981).
427
Freed, supra note 307, at 33.
428
Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 458.
429
Id. at 459.
430
Id. at 479.
420
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In its opinion, the Court did not thoroughly address the issue of the
interconnection between intellectual property laws and antitrust laws.
Its most relevant statement in this regard is contained in a succinct
footnote.431 In footnote 29 of its opinion, the Supreme Court
introduced some confusion as to whether a patent owner may be
compelled under antitrust laws to license its technology.432 The
Court noted that “power gained through some natural advantage or
legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can
give rise to liability, if a seller exploits its dominant position in one
market to expand his empire into the next.”433 Although it is unclear
whether the Court endorsed the theory that an IP owner could be
required to license its rights to avoid antitrust liability,434 the Kodak I
decision decisively influenced the rulings by lower courts in the Data
General435 and Kodak II436 cases.
b. The Relevance of the Protection of Innovation Markets
for the Development of the Essential Facilities Doctrine:
the Microsoft and Intel Cases
i. The Implementation of the Intellectual Property
Guidelines
The IP Guidelines state that U.S. agencies will protect competition
in innovation markets.437 According to the IP Guidelines research
and development directed at particular new or improved goods or
processes characterizes an innovation market.438 This concept is
431

Id. at 479,n. 29.
See id.
433
Id.
434
Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1215-16 (declining however to specifically address the question
of antitrust liability based upon a unilateral refusal to deal in a patented or copyrighted
product).
435
See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
436
See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1215-16.
437
See IP Guidelines, supra note 5, at § 3.2.3.
438
See id. A commentator has defined “innovation” as a process which “concerns the
R&D to create products which do not exist for markets that may be only dimly conceived.
This is a search for competitive markets before there are sales, before there are even patents
432
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important because if U.S. courts and antitrust authorities consider the
process of competitive innovation in a particular field as a separate
“good” that requires protection, plaintiffs may then go a step further,
and demand that a competitor grant a license on the grounds that its
IPRs constitute an essential facility. U.S. agencies have already
relied on this innovation concept in at least two landmark antitrust
cases. Indeed, the protection of innovation markets underlies the
approach taken by the Department of Justice in United States v.
Microsoft439 and by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) in the In
re Intel case.440
ii. The Microsoft Case and the Essential Facilities
Doctrine
Since the facts in the Microsoft case are generally well-known,
they will not be addressed in detail here.441 It is germane, however,
that in Microsoft the innovation concerns related to the preservation
of development of future Windows alternatives.442 Nevertheless, the
district court’s Findings of Fact have been criticized for not having
specified sufficiently how the alleged anticompetitive conduct of
Microsoft is supposed to have affected, or might affect the
innovation efforts of potential competitors in the computer operating
systems market.443 According to Judge Jackson, “[t]here is
or trade secrets.” Kobak, supra note 6, at 361. Protecting innovation markets requires
authorities to prosecute actions which may harm the ability and incentives of existing and
potential rivals in R&D for the future. Valentine supra note 5, at 9.
439
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of
Fact); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Conclusions of
Law).
440
In re Intel Corp., No. 9288, Agreement Containing Consent Order, (FTC March 17,
1999) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelagreement.htm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2001). Intergraph, an Intel customer, also brought a civil lawsuit under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act against Intel in a District Court. The FTC’s findings are broader than the
civil Intel case since the opinion analyzed the behavior of Intel towards Intergraph, Digital,
and Compaq. Moreover, the FTC, unlike the District Court, took into account the
innovation market concept in its evaluation of the anti-competitive conduct. See id.
441
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact).
442
Id. at 27; James B. Kobak, Jr., Microsoft: Questions of Harm and Remedy, Vol. 14, 4
CLA BULLETIN, 118, 120 (2000).
443
See id.
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insufficient evidence to find that, absent Microsoft’s actions,
Navigator and Java already would have ignited genuine competition
in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems.”444 Despite
this finding, the court held that Microsoft “retarded, and perhaps
altogether extinguished, the process by which these two middleware
technologies could have facilitated the introduction of competition
into an important market.”445 The court also found that Microsoft
sacrificed revenues by giving away Internet Explorer in order to
achieve this objective.446 Regrettably, as Professor Kobak has
pointed out,447 the court did not make any specific finding that
Microsoft would recoup its losses, as the Supreme Court requires in a
pure predatory pricing case.448
On April 3, 2000, Judge Jackson issued his Conclusions of Law.449
The court held that Microsoft violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act
by unlawfully maintaining its monopoly power in the Intelcompatible PC operating systems market, and by attempting to
monopolize the Web browser market by anticompetitive means.450
The court also found that Microsoft violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act by unlawfully tying its Web browser to its operating
system.451
According to the Conclusions of Law, the exclusionary conducts
of Microsoft were aimed at eliminating interoperability of
middleware software applications - Navigator and Java - to preserve
the high entry barriers in the market for Intel-compatible PC
operating systems.452 By maintaining high entry barriers, Microsoft
sought to prevent potential software developers from attempting to
develop an operating system to compete with Windows.453
444

Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 112 (Findings of Fact).
See supra note 442 (emphasis added).
446
Id. at 46.
447
See Kobak, supra note 442, at 120.
448
See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243
(1993).
449
Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 35 (Conclusions of Law).
450
Id.
451
Id.
452
Id. at 38-39.
453
Id.
445
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While a thorough analysis of the Microsoft case goes beyond the
scope of this essay, the issue regarding the kind of remedies that
would be equitable in the Microsoft case provoked a hot debate that
is worth mentioning.454 A wide range of remedies is available to a
court depending on their effects upon the defendant’s business. The
court can choose between conduct and structural remedies, or
combine elements of each, depending on its liability findings and its
goals for relief.455
The remedy must be proportional to the need to recreate the
market situation that would have existed absent the alleged
anticompetitive conduct.456 In some cases it will be enough to order
a simple injunction to prevent the repetition of any illegal practices.
In others, a court may go further and prohibit discrimination or ban
tying and exclusive arrangements. Only when conduct remedies may
be ineffective to restore the competitive conditions of the market
should the court consider structural relief (dissolution of the
defendant or divestiture of assets).457
Courts also must take into account the characteristics of the
industry in which the relief will produce its effects.458 Particularly in
markets involving high-technology industries, courts have imperfect
information available and their mistakes are likely to be enduring and
costly.459 Over-deterrence may interfere with the market’s self454

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64-70 (D.D.C. 2000). The issue
of the proper remedies in the Microsoft case has been subject to conflicting commentaries.
Compare John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, A (Cautionary) Note on Remedies in the
Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST 25, 28 (1999) (arguing against the adoption of structural
remedies; i.e.; the breaking-up of Microsoft) with R. Craig Romaine & Steven C. Salop,
Slap Their Wrist? Tie their Hands? Slice Them Into Pieces? Alternative Remedies for
Monopolization in the Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST 15, 17-18 (1999) (arguing that, due to
the network effects of the Windows operating system, the structural remedy is the only
efficient remedy to restore competition in the market).
455
Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 17-19.
456
Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27-28.
457
Id. at 26.
458
Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 15.
459
Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 25-26; Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine,
Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 617 (1999) (stating that Microsoft “may determine the course of computer software
industry for the next ten or twenty years”).
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correcting forces,460 especially in high-technology markets where
rewards drive innovation.461 If those rewards are taken away,
innovation will likely decline, and in the long run consumers will
suffer.462
In Microsoft, the court ultimately chose a combination of structural
and conduct remedies.463 On June 7, 2000, the court issued its final
judgment, adopting the DOJ’s proposed remedies and ordering
Microsoft to divide, into two firms, one selling Windows and the
other selling business applications such as Word or Internet
Explorer.464 The goal of this remedy was to lower barriers to entry
into the operating systems market by eliminating the incentive for
Microsoft to leverage its operating system monopoly power into the
business applications market.465 The costs of this remedy on
Microsoft’s business, and the difficult decision facing Microsoft
officers in terms of selecting the line of business to be retained, may
be better evaluated by taking into account that Microsoft earns about
45% of its revenue from Windows and more than 40% from its
business applications.466
The court also imposed upon Microsoft several conduct remedies
to be implemented over a period of three years if the breakup order
withstands appeal, and ten years if it does not.467 The restrictions are
460

Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 25-26.
Id. at 27. Salop and Romaine have argued that liability standards should not be more
permissive in high-technology industries. Salop & Romaine, supra note 459, at 664. These
economists state that when:
[A] market is driven more by innovation than price competition, then entrants
also must have an open environment to challenge the monopoly. An overly
permissive antitrust regime may reduce aggregate innovation, as innovation by
entrants by potential new entrants and small competitors is reduced by more
than innovation by the monopolist increases.
Id. This approach, however, appears to overlook that over-deterrence in a particular case
may have a spillover effect in the whole industry so that potential entrants or competitors
also may be discouraged from committing resources to innovation.
462
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000).
463
Id.
464
Id.
465
See id.
466
Microsoft Split Ordered by Judge Jackson, 13 SOFTWARE LAW BULLETIN, July 2000,
at 111.
467
See Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
461
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aimed at neutralizing the primary potential drawback of ordering the
divestiture of Microsoft along functional lines.468 Microsoft could
circumvent the divestiture order by achieving a de facto integration
with favored partners, mainly through the discriminatory disclosure
of Windows application programming interfaces (“APIs”)469 or other
technical information regarding the interoperability of applications
with Windows, and also through the use of tying clauses and
exclusive dealing clauses.470 To prevent this circumvention, the final
judgment imposes upon Microsoft: (i) the obligation to disclose, in a
timely and non-discriminatory manner, technical information about
its products to internet service vendors, independent hardware
vendors, and original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs “); (ii) a
prohibition on modifying its operating system to interfere with or
degrade the performance of non-Microsoft programs; (iii) a ban on
exclusive dealing and tying arrangements that condition the granting
of Windows on an OEM or other licensee agreeing to obtain any
other Microsoft product; and (iv) a ban on tying middleware
products, such as Internet Explorer or Microsoft’s version of Java, to
the purchase of Windows.471
It must be pointed out that neither the DOJ nor the district court
relied on the essential facilities doctrine to seek a Section 2
infringement declaration.472
However, the court could have
concluded, in deciding which remedy was the most appropriate, that
Windows was an essential facility. This could have happened, for
instance, if Judge Jackson had accepted the argument that imposing a
structural remedy was not in society’s interests because of the high
468

See id.
See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 24, n. 18. APIs are the instructions
required by application developers to write an application (such as Netscape or Java) that
will run on a particular operating system or interoperate with another particular application.
Id. The Windows APIs are controlled by Microsoft and contain the information developers
need to write software that runs on the Windows operating system. Id.
470
See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 21.
471
See Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 65-69.
472
See generally Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 59. (finding a § 2 Sherman Act violation
by focusing on: (1) whether a relevant market existed; (2) whether Microsoft possessed
actual power to exclude competition from the relevant market, and; (3) whether Microsoft
used anticompetitive methods to achieve or maintain its position without pro-competitive
business motives).
469
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fragmentation cost this measure might entail.473 In order to qualify
as an essential facility, Windows must be considered “indispensable”
for applications developers to remain in the market.474 Under the test
laid out by the court in MCI, this means that other actual or potential
competitors cannot and could not practically or reasonably duplicate
Windows. 475
The Microsoft court found that competitors cannot feasibly
duplicate Windows.476 However, in the computer industry, a sector
characterized by a high tendency towards innovation as well as the
presence of strong financial and technical players, one could question
whether it is practical or economically feasible to develop viable
alternatives to Windows within a reasonable period of time.477
In view of the market reality of computer industry, it is arguable
that neither the investment nor the time required to develop a new
operating system would be insurmountable for potential entrants in
the operating systems market. Even if the court had doubts about the
likely availability of Windows alternatives, the structure of the
computer market itself should have established a strong presumption
that viable alternatives were possible. Further, the existence of other
operating systems such as Unix, Linux and Netware confirms that it
is feasible to develop operating systems as alternatives to

473

See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 20.
See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, Inc., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); see
also discussion infra Section III.C.2.
475
See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1133.
476
See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, ¶¶ 18-29 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of Fact).
According to the court:
Currently there are no products, nor are there likely to be any in the near future,
that a significant percentage of consumers worldwide could substitute for Intelcompatible PC operating systems without incurring substantial costs.
Furthermore, no firm that does not currently market Intel-compatible PC
operating systems could start doing so in a way that would, within a reasonably
short period of time, present a significant percentage of consumers with a
viable alternative to existing Intel-compatible PC operating systems (emphasis
added).
Id. The Microsoft court, however, does not specify how short the period to establish a
viable alternative to Windows must be to avoid antitrust liability. See Hawker, supra note
226, at 137-38.
477
See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27-28.
474
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Windows.478
If the creation of an alternative to Windows were technically and
economically feasible, then the main condition under the MCI test
for qualification as an essential facility would not be met.479 The
MCI court found that it was not feasible to duplicate a local
telephone network, in part because it was uneconomical, largely
because MCI could not obtain regulatory clearance to duplicate local
networks.480
If Windows were considered an essential facility, several
alternative or cumulative remedies could be imposed on
Microsoft.481 The most feasible remedy would probably have been
to order Microsoft to license its Windows source code to other
companies.482 Like the remedy actually ordered, this remedy would
have led to the breaking-up of the company. However, unlike the
“business line breaking-up” solution ultimately selected, which
leaves the Windows business intact, Microsoft would have been
divided into several independent firms selling competing versions of
Windows.
The question that arises is whether the breaking-up of Microsoft,
in any of its variations, may be disproportionate in view of the
infringements found by the court. If we assume that the objective of
equitable relief is to restore the competitive structure and consumer
welfare that would have developed absent Microsoft’s
anticompetitive conduct,483 then it is reasonable to argue that the
breaking-up of the company goes beyond what is necessary to restore

478
However, the functioning and maintenance of Linux, Unix and Netware require a
more developed computer technical assistance than Windows, although the difference
between Linux and Windows on this point is narrowing.
479
See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1081.
480
See id. at 1133.
481
See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 15.
482
See id. at 21-22 (distinguishing between two possible licensing remedies:
“compulsory licenses” and a “one-time licensing auction.” The latter would not require the
sharing of newly developed IP over a long period of time because of the one-time nature of
the entitlement). See also Steve Lohr, On Breaking up Microsoft Into “Baby Bills”, N.Y
TIMES, Mar. 5 1999, at C2.
483
See Salop & Romaine, supra note 459, at 667.
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this status quo ante.484
Some commentators have pointed out that the usual conditions
requisite for structural relief are not present in Microsoft.485
Microsoft did not achieve its monopoly by illegal acquisitions or as a
result of government regulations, but simply by offering a product
that consumers preferred.486 That Microsoft acquired its monopoly
lawfully does not necessarily mean, however, that a structural
remedy could not be appropriate in some situations.487 For instance,
if Microsoft had faced competition, and destroyed its most likely
potential competitor by means of exclusionary practices, then it
could have been persuasively argued that a structural remedy was
necessary to “kick-start” the market.488 It is unclear, however, both
in the Findings of Fact and in the Conclusions of Law, to what extent
Microsoft’s conduct impeded the introduction of a viable alternative
to Windows.489
The court appears to acknowledge that Microsoft did not prevent
the entrance of other competitors into the market, since the court was
not able to identify any specific potential entrant.490 Imposing on
Microsoft the creation of rivals, based on the general presumption
that Microsoft would have stifled innovation in the operating systems
market, may be overreaching. The breaking-up of Microsoft will
introduce a level of competition greater than that which market
forces would likely have introduced, but for Microsoft’s conduct. In
other words, this measure may lead to the creation of
“governmentally sanctioned free riders,” undermining the incentives
to innovate.491

484

See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27.
See id.; see also Kobak, supra note 442, at 121.
486
See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27.
487
See id.
488
See Salop & Romaine, supra note 459, at 18.
489
See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999)
(Findings of Fact); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000)
(Conclusions of Law).
490
See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (Findings of Fact); Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 30
(Conclusions of Law) .
491
See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27.
485
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The alleged network effects of Windows have also provided
ammunition to those defending structural relief as necessary.492
Commentators have argued that, since Windows exhibits network
effects, conduct remedies might be insufficient to “kick-start” the
market.493 The idea underlying this argument is that markets for
goods exhibiting strong network effects tend to involve high barriers
to entry, mainly because in these kinds of markets the value of the
goods depends directly on the number of consumers.494 Thus, once a
monopoly is achieved it is difficult for new entrants or competitors to
replace the incumbent, even if they offer a superior product.495
This approach ignores the difficulty of applying the network
theory to justify structural remedies in Microsoft.496 First, it
overlooks the fact that high-technology industries are not inclined to
have network effects.497 In those markets, especially in the software
industry, it is difficult to argue that an incumbent, even one whose
market power is protected through exclusionary acts, will retain its
advantage when faced with competition from a superior product.498
Second, even if the operating systems market exhibits network
effects, structural remedies might be appropriate to correct a situation
provided that a company used illegal exclusionary practices to tip the
market to its product, thereby locking in consumers to a possibly
inferior standard.499 In this situation, conduct remedies would be
insufficient to recreate the market that would have existed had the
exclusionary conduct not occurred.500 It has not been proven,
however, that Microsoft locked its customers into a product
technologically inferior to the product that could have existed but for
492

See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 18.
See Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673,
674 (1999).
494
See id.
495
See id.
496
See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27-28.
497
Id.
498
Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 28 (stating that “there is no empirical evidence
that network markets in fact lock in on inferior standards. To the contrary, empirical studies
of software markets indicate that superior products regularly displace inferior ones”) .
499
Id. at 27.
500
See Romaine & Salop, supra note 454, at 18-20.
493
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Microsoft’s exclusionary practices.501
The DOJ accused Microsoft of using illegal exclusionary practices
to maintain high application barriers in the market for computer
operating systems, thereby entrenching its monopoly.502 The court
held that Microsoft, in order to achieve a monopoly, sought to
exclude Netscape and Java from their respective markets, thereby
preventing the evolution of both applications into a competing
platform.503 These findings would only justify the imposition of a
structural remedy upon Microsoft if it had been proven that the
browser and Java markets actually tipped to the Microsoft
standard.504 In light of this reasoning, the structural remedy imposed
upon Microsoft may be overreaching.505 It would have been enough
to impose upon Microsoft a conduct remedy, such as the
disallowance of exclusionary practices or the ban of tying and
exclusive dealing arrangements, to thwart Microsoft’s alleged
entrenching plans.506
iii. The Intel Case: The Federal Trade Commission
Complaint and Consent Order
The FTC/Intel case507 was initiated by an FTC complaint charging
Intel with a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act for having refused
to continue to provide trade secret information on its new products to
three of its customers (Intergraph, Digital Equipment and
Compaq).508 The FTC alleged Intel’s conduct was a means of
coercing licenses to its customers’ rival microprocessor
technology.509 The FTC’s legal argument was a classic Section 2
501
502

Fact).
503

Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D.D.C. 1999) (Findings of

Id. at 30-34, 105.
See Lopatka & Page, supra note 454, at 27.
505
See id.
506
See id. at 28; Cotter, supra note 9, at 13.
507
See In re Intel Corp., No. 9288, Complaint, 1, 3-4, ¶ 11-14, 42 (FTC June 8, 1998),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
508
See id.
509
The commitments undertaken by Intel in the consent decree are in stark contrast with
504
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argument, alleging that Intel had willfully maintained its monopoly
power in the microprocessors market through exclusionary
conduct.510
The FTC, finally settling through a consent decree, concluded that
“a natural and probable effect” of Intel’s conduct was to diminish the
incentives to Intergraph, Digital Equipment (“Digital”) and Compaq,
as well as other firms that were Intel customers or otherwise
commercially dependent upon Intel, to develop innovations relating
to microprocessor technology.511 This vague language reflects that
the FTC asserted its theory in almost doctrinaire fashion, offering no
proof of actual competitive harm or tangible diminution of research
effort.512
This criticism may apply only to the FTC’s position vis-à-vis the
conduct of Intel regarding Intergraph, not Digital. While the former
was not a competitor of Intel, the latter was competing with Intel in
the microprocessors market with its Alpha microprocessor.513 Thus,
as far as Digital was concerned, the FTC’s fears that innovation
would be hindered and stifled by Intel’s behavior may have been
justified.514 However, this distinction does not necessarily justify the
FTC’s position. The antitrust analysis required to sustain a
compulsory license is meager both in the FTC Complaint and in the
subsequent Consent Decree. Regardless of whether Digital was an
actual or potential competitor of Intel, the FTC’s position needed a
the holding of the Federal Circuit in Intel’s appeal of the district court’s opinion. See
generally Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (1999 Fed. Cir.). The district court
granted a preliminary injunction requiring Intel to continue providing Intergraph access to
technical information about its new products. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1999 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 9681 (D. N. Ala. 1999). The Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff had not
proved that Intel had monopolized or attempted to monopolize any market by refusing to
give Intergraph trade secret information regarding improvements in its microprocessors.
Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1363-64.
510
See Valentine, supra note 5, at 8-9.
511
See In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, at 4, ¶14.
512
See James B. Kobak, Jr., Microsoft Decision Article, (working paper, on file with
author); see also Orson Swindle, What Are We Learning from the Microsoft Case?, Speech
delivered before the Federalist Society (September 30, 1990), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/swindle/federalist990930.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
513
See In re Intel Corp., No. 9288, Complaint, at 4, ¶17.
514
See id. at 4-5, ¶15-21.
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more detailed analysis. First, the FTC should have closely examined
whether Intel had a monopoly in the microprocessors market, and
second, whether, through the alleged anticompetitive conduct
described in the Complaint, Intel entrenched its alleged monopoly.
That Intel might not have monopoly power in the microprocessors
market, despite its approximately 80% market share, is not merely a
hypothesis. In an industry with such a high level of innovation,
comprised of financially and technically robust players, high market
share can be eroded quickly by existing or potential competitors.
Therefore, U.S. agencies should have been more circumspect in
finding a monopoly in the microprocessors market.515
Even if we accept that Intel had monopoly power, whether this
case was about preservation of monopoly power is far from clear.516
Intergraph abandoned the microprocessor business when it began
using Intel chips.517 As commentators have pointed out, there is no
evidence to suggest that Intergraph was in a position to produce
competing chips in the foreseeable future, or even that it was
planning to do so.518 With regard to Digital, it seems that the Alpha
microprocessor was already competing, albeit it unsuccessfully, with
the Intel Pentium microprocessor.519 These facts cast doubt on
whether Intel’s behavior was aimed at entrenching a monopoly, or
rather at defending itself against patent infringements, as the circuit
court suggests in the judgment issued in the civil litigation
proceedings.520
The FTC supported its monopolization claim by arguing that
Intel’s behavior was unnecessary and served no pro-competitive
515
The position taken by FTC Commissioner, Orson Swindle, supports this argument,
expressing uncertainty as to “whether Intel, despite its extremely large market share in
general purpose microprocessors, actually had monopoly because it appeared to face
aggressive competition from innovative firms, especially those that were supplying general
purpose microprocessors for personal computers costing less than $ 1,000.” See Orson
Swindle, supra note 512.
516
See Randal C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel, 23 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 159, 177 (1999).
517
Id. at 190; Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1350 (1999 Fed. Cir.).
518
Picker, supra note 516, at 177-78.
519
Id. at 178.
520
See Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1357-58.
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purpose.521 The question remains, however, whether a firm’s
defensive measures should serve a pro-competitive purpose. Intel
may have had a legitimate business justification for no longer
treating those three customers as “preferred” when faced with
expensive patent litigation.522 Under this view, the FTC may have
turned what was really no more than a patent dispute between a
supplier and its customers into an antitrust case.
Phrased differently, Intel’s conduct may not be seen by the FTC as
pro-competitive, but why should it be? Intel’s conduct was
contractually justified because its supply agreements with its
customers provided for termination without cause.523 It was also
commercially justified because a firm in this position, even one
enjoying market power, would normally try to accommodate its
customer relationships.524
The broad language used both in FTC/Intel and Microsoft
underlines the main problem in defining innovation markets. If what
antitrust laws are trying to protect is the process of innovation, and
this process may take place before a product has even been created
and put into the market, then U.S. agencies and courts will often
have scant empirical evidence about innovation markets, since
companies prefer not to disclose much information on their
innovations.525
Moreover, the anticompetitive impact of an
agreement or a refusal to license on R&D is difficult to establish
because a negative effect can often only be determined after such
work has been completed.526
The lack of empirical evidence may create legal uncertainty in
U.S. courts and agencies’ findings, as well as significant failures in
521
In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 5, ¶20 (FTC June 8, 1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
522
See W. Greg Papciak, Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 323,
337-38 (1999).
523
Id. at 340.
524
Id.
525
See Laurence B. Landman, Innovation and Structure of Competition: Future Markets
in European and American Law, 81 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 838, 878 (1999).
526
Id. at 860-64 (explaining why legal and regulatory structures in which agencies
operate will not allow them to find innovation markets).

BACHES OPI.PP6

480

3/22/01 4:30 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.11:409

their decisions.527 Given the financial and material resources which
R&D often entails, a mistaken decision in this field may discourage
future investments in this field, ironically stifling competition instead
of opening up future markets.
Commentators have argued that the FTC and DOJ policy regarding
the protection of innovation in the computer industry is based on a
faulty hypothesis, namely, that U.S. agencies believe that protection
of innovation promotes competition, which leads to lower prices and
faster innovation.528 However, one should wonder to what extent
cases such as Intel are necessary in an industry that has witnessed
price declines and product improvements as fast as any other
industry.529 Likewise, one should wonder about the efficiency of the
remedies imposed by U.S. agencies or courts on today’s
extraordinarily dynamic markets.530
2. Refusals to License: Is Antitrust Law Encroaching Upon
Intellectual Property Laws’ Domain?
a. The Tide is Rising for Intellectual Property Rights: Data
General, Kodak II and the Federal Trade Commission
Consent Decree in Intel.
The tension among the different approaches toward the interplay
between antitrust liability and intellectual property rights referred to
in Section IV.A above is reflected in conflicting judgments regarding
refusals to license. Although the First Circuit in Data General531 and
the Ninth Circuit in Kodak II532 did not rely on the essential facilities
doctrine, the holding in both cases provides support for its

527

See Kobak, supra note 6, at 359.
See Robert J. Barro, Why the Antitrust Cops Should Lay Off High Tech, BUSINESS
WEEK, Aug. 17, 1998, at 20.
529
See id.
530
See id.
531
Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
532
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
528
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application to IPRs.533 In stark contrast, in In re: Independent
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation,534 the Tenth Circuit
expressly refused to follow the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Kodak II.
Instead, it held that, in the absence of proof that the monopolist
acquired the protection of IPRs in an unlawful manner, a refusal to
license is immune from antitrust laws.535
In Data General, a computer manufacturer, Data General (“DG”),
refused to license its copyright over a sophisticated computer
program to an independent service provider (“Grumman”).536 The
program is used to diagnose problems in DG computers.537 DG and
Grumman were competitors in the market for service to DG
computers.538 Grumman contended that by refusing to license its
copyright, DG had illegally maintained its monopoly in the service
market.539 DG argued that IPRs are immune from antitrust laws.540
The court refused to heed DG’s argument that a refusal to license can
never constitute exclusionary conduct.541 The court concluded that a
monopolist’s refusal to deal is not always entirely pro-competitive
because consumers can be harmed by such refusal.542
Accordingly, the court reasoned that some type of presumption
may be appropriate to evaluate these situations.543 After reviewing
precedent and relevant patent and copyright statutes, the court held
that neither the Sherman Act544 nor the Copyright Act545 works a
partial repeal of the other.546 Thus IPRs, although protected by
533

See James E. Hartley, Monopolization: The Essential Facility Doctrine and the
Market Shares for Monopolization and Attempt Cases, SC71 ALI-ABA 249, 254 (1998).
534
989 F. Supp. 1131, 1134 (D. Kan. 1997).
535
See id. at 1134.
536
See Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir.
1994).
537
See id. at 1152.
538
See id. (Grumman, a “third party maintainer,” provided, repair and maintenance
services which came to involve the servicing of Data General’s computers).
539
See id.
540
See id.
541
See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1187.
542
See id.
543
See id.
544
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
545
17 U.S.C. § 411 (2000).
546
See Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir.
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intellectual property laws, are not explicitly exempt from the
application of antitrust law.547 The court then reasoned that the most
appropriate way to harmonize intellectual property laws and antitrust
laws was to establish a presumption whereby, “while exclusionary
conduct can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a
copyright, an author’s desire to exclude others from using its
copyrighted work is presumptively valid business justification for
any immediate harm to consumers.”548
Thus, the court in Data General established a rebuttable
presumption for unilateral refusals to license a copyright.549
However, it did not delineate the situations in which that
presumption can be overcome.550 The only specific reference to the
possible grounds for such rebuttal is found in footnote 64 of the
decision.551 There, the court indicated that the presumption may be
rebutted when imposing antitrust liability “is unlikely to frustrate the
objective of the Copyright Act.”552 Although, this statement does not
precisely identify those situations, the decision enables the
identification of at least two situations where the presumption may
be overcome.553
First, the presumption may be rebutted in Aspen Skiing-type
cases.554 Contrary to Grumman’s request, the court refused to apply
Aspen Skiing to the facts of the case at bar arguing that the reasoning
of Aspen Skiing does not hinge on the fact that the defendant in that
case withdrew assistance upon which competitors may have relied
when entering the market.555 According to the First Circuit, Aspen
Skiing turns on a comparison of the behavior of firms in a
competitive market with a monopolist behavior once competition has

1994).
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id., n. 64.
See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188.
See id.
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1982).
See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1156.
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been curtailed.556 Thus, the analytical framework of Aspen Skiing
could not be transposed to the facts of Data General since the court
was unable to view DGs market practices in both competitive and
noncompetitive conditions.557 Unlike the defendant in Aspen Skiing,
DG had always been a monopolist in the market for servicing its
computers, despite the inroads made by third-party maintainers.558
Second, by holding that Grumman did not prove that DG had
acquired its software in an unlawful manner, the court implied that
the presumption could also be overcome if the plaintiff shows the
defendant has misused its IPRs.559
In Kodak II, the Ninth Circuit adopted a “modified version” of the
rebuttable presumption laid down by Data General.560 The court
held that “while exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist’s
unilateral refusal to deal to sell a [patent or] copyright, or to sell its
patented or copyrighted work, a monopolist desire to exclude others
from its [protected] work is a presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers.”561 The court
reached this conclusion despite having found “no reported case in
which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to
sell or license a patent or copyright.”562
The difference between the Kodak II and Data General
presumptions is found in the circumstances in which the
presumptions may be rebutted.563 The Ninth Circuit endorsed Data
General’s approach, concluding that the presumption of legitimacy
can be rebutted by evidence that the monopolist acquired the
protection of intellectual property laws unlawfully.564 Significantly,
however, the court added that the presumption may also be rebutted
556

See id.; see also Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 587.
See supra note 556.
558
Compare Data General, 36 F.3d at 1156, with Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. 587 (Data
General had provided an exclusive maintenance service to its computers, whereas Aspen
Skiing Co. joined with its competitors to provide an “all-Aspen” pass for all resorts.).
559
See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188-89.
560
See id. at 1156; Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218.
561
See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218.
562
See id. at 1216.
563
See In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
564
See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1218.
557
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“by evidence of pretext.”565 The court found that neither the aims of
intellectual property law, nor of antitrust law, justify allowing a
monopolist to rely upon a pretextual business justifications to mask
anticompetitive conduct.566
The procedural history of the case is helpful in understanding why
the court eventually rejected Kodak’s justification for its refusal to
deal with ISOs.567 The Ninth Circuit confirmed a jury’s finding that
Kodak had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by refusing to
supply patented and unpatented replacement parts for its copiers.568
Kodak relied on the protection of its patents as a valid business
justification for refusing to supply some of the replacement parts,
only after the case was remanded from the Supreme Court to the
Ninth Circuit.569
The court then rejected this argument as
pretextual.570
The court found evidence of pretext in the “state of mind” of
Kodak employees.571 In particular, the court recalled that Kodak’s
parts manager testified that “patents did not cross [his] mind” at the
time Kodak began to change its parts policy.572 The court also found
that Kodak had not distinguished between patented or copyrighted
parts and non-patented or non-copyrighted parts.573 Instead, Kodak
issued a blanket refusal to sell any replacement parts to ISOs.574 In
light of the pretextual reasons submitted by Kodak as justification for
its refusal, the court took the unprecedented step of requiring
complete compulsory licensing by a firm not found to have engaged
in illegal tying, improper infringement suits, or any other patent

565

See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1188.
See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1219.
567
See id. at 1212 (discussing that exclusionary conduct does not violate § 2 of the
Sherman Act if it is supported by a legitimate business justification).
568
See id. at 1219.
569
See id. at 1219-20.
570
See id. (rejecting Kodak’s business justification argument on the basis of pretext,
finding that it was not a “genuine reason for Kodak’s conduct”).
571
See id.
572
See Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1210-20.
573
See id. at 1220.
574
See id. at 1219.
566
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misuse.575
The Kodak II decision has been widely criticized as inconsistent
with the Patent Act as amended in 1988 as well as with Supreme
Court jurisprudence.576 Section 271(d) of the Patent Act states that:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement. . .of a patent shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent
right by reason of. . .[the patent owners’] (4) refus[sal] to
license or use any rights to the patent; or (5)
condition[ing] the license of any rights to the patent or
the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a
separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the
patent owner has market power in the relevant market for
the patent or patented product on which the license or
sale is conditioned.577
For these commentators, a refusal to license is clearly not an
illegal extension of the patent right within the meaning of Section
271(d)(4) of the Patent Act.578 They argued that by disregarding
congressional intent, the Kodak II court made a mistake when it
condemned a patentee’s simple refusal to sell its patented parts.579
The court’s reasoning that the Patent Act did no more than codify the
existing law does not help to resolve the inconsistency of its ruling
with the Patent Act. As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp point
out, the fact that a limiting statute merely codifies existing law hardly
justifies the adoption of a rule significantly expanding existing law;
existing law had never compelled licensing in the absence of misuse
and in conflict with the statute’s language.580

575

See id.; see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 190.
35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000); see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 53, at 190-200;
Burling Lee & Krug, supra note 197at 527; Kauffman, supra note 7 at 471; Hovenkamp,
supra note 205.
577
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
578
See id.; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 198.
579
See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 197-98.
580
See id.
576
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These commentators have also argued that the introduction of an
intent-based presumption in Kodak II is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s holding in Professional Real Estate v. Columbia
Pictures Industries (“PRE”).581 In PRE, the Supreme Court held that
the right of a copyright holder to pursue an infringement action
cannot be made dependent on its anticompetitive “state of mind.”582
The Kodak II rule creates this anomalous situation: under PRE a
patentee who files an infringement action to exclude the alleged
infringer from some market may have its infringement claim
resolved on patent law merits without regard to its intent.583 By
contrast, the patentee who merely refuses to license its patent is
subject to antitrust scrutiny depending on whether its intent was
anticompetitive.584 Although a copyright case, PRE is consistent
with the Patent Act, which allows exclusionary activity without
reference to the patent holder’s subjective motivations.585 Lower
courts have consistently applied PRE to patent infringement actions
as well.586
Given this Supreme Court decision, it is difficult to understand
why the Ninth Circuit in Kodak II ignored this precedent and failed
to explain its reasons for deviating from it.587 Perhaps the Kodak II
court did not refer to PRE because the Supreme Court in PRE
applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to an infringement action.588
581

See id.; Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 8 U.S. at 57-58.
583
See generally id.; Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1195.
584
Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 57-58.
585
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 189-190.
586
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 192.
587
Id.
588
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine establishes the basic principle of antitrust immunity
for petitioning conduct. This doctrine is rooted in the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution which states that: “Congress shall make no law [. . .] abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petitioning
the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I, art. 1. According to
this doctrine, joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even
though intended to eliminate competition. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381U.S. 657
(1965). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine originally applied to immunize efforts to influence
legislative or administrative officials, but was extended by the Supreme Court to insulate
from antitrust laws attempts to influence adjudicative bodies. See California Motor
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
582
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Thus, the court may have thought that since Kodak was not bringing
an infringement action, but rather taking action to keep patented
parts out of the hands of possible infringers, Kodak’s behavior could
not be analogized to an infringement action enough to justify an
application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
A recent case supports the idea that the Kodak II decision is
inconsistent with PRE. In Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. NBC,589 a
district court held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies not
only to infringement actions, but also to pre-litigation actions.590
According to the court, which quoted Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp on this point, given that pre-litigation communications
provide useful notice of potential liability and facilitate the
settlement of controversies, it would be unwise to apply antitrust
rules to them.591 The district court did not analogize pre-litigation
communications to refusals to license.592 However, the reasoning in
Primetime 24 supports an argument that an IP holder that refuses to
license its IPRs cannot be held liable under antitrust laws depending
on whether its subjective intent was anticompetitive.
Even if the ruling in Kodak II were consistent with the Patent Act
and Supreme Court precedent, there would be grounds to argue that
it is inappropriate to rely on the state of mind of the defendant to
determine whether the plaintiff has overcome the presumption that
the defendant’s refusal to license IPRs was not anticompetitive. In
intellectual property cases, the anticompetitive behavior or intent
coincides with the specific subject matter of IPRs, namely, giving the
holder the power to exclude competition.593 By allowing the plaintiff
to rely on the defendant’s subjective motivations to rebut the
presumption, the court may have given plaintiffs the upper hand in
rebutting the presumption.594 One can hardly imagine a situation
where a patent holder’s sole purpose in refusing to deal with a
589
590
591
592
593
594

1998).

21 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D. N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 356-57.
Id.
See id. at 350.
See Patterson, supra note 254, at 1138-40.
See generally Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. NBC, 21 F. Supp. 2d 350 (S.D. N.Y.
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competitor would be a desire to protect its IPRs.595 Such a desire is
always driven by the goal of increasing profits by being the sole
supplier of the protected good or service.596
According to some authors, Kodak II stands as an example of how
a careless application of antitrust laws597 may create concerns in
licensing strategies.598 By finding that Kodak had unlawfully
leveraged its monopoly power from the replacement parts market
into the market for services, the court disregarded Kodak’s twohundred and twenty patents on sixty-five of the necessary parts.599
The court’s reasoning and understanding of the relationship between
a patent and the market it affects is unrealistic. Leveraging does not
exist when a patent holder merely exercises the rights inherent in its
IPRs, because these IPRs give the holder the right to exclude
competition in different markets.600 According to this school of
thought, decisions like Kodak II may have adverse effects on IP
holders. By facilitating competitors’ access to IPRs through
595

Kauffman, supra note 7, at 523; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 193.
Kauffman, supra note 7, at 523.
597
It has been argued that the court finding of monopoly power was based on
insufficient evidence. The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was substantial evidence that
Kodak possessed the requisite market share to constitute monopoly power on the basis of
the following: (i) Kodak’s own manufacturer of Kodak parts (30%); (ii) its control of
OEMs’ sales of Kodak parts to ISOs through tooling clauses (20-25%); and (iii) its
discouragement of other part-makers from selling Kodak parts to ISOs. Notice that the
court only identified a 55% market share by Kodak. The court presumed the percentage of
“discouraged sales,” despite the fact that the ISOs did not provide proof of any agreement or
practice to discourage these sales. Moreover, the court could not calculate the percentage of
parts made by other part manufacturers affected by the alleged discouraging practices. See
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 195; Kauffman, supra note 7, at 514-16.
598
Westermeier, supra note 307, at 242-43.
599
Id. at 241.
600
See Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 539. Professor Hovenkamp has stated:
Kodak reasoned that the patent entitled Kodak to protect its parts monopoly but
not its service monopoly.
But this reasoning rests on a flawed
misunderstanding of a patent. A patent describes an invention not a market.
Many patents, particularly for intermediate goods, might be used in final
products or processes that operate in a wide variety of markets. For example, a
patent mixing process might be applied to paint, peanut butter, and prescription
drugs. A patented microprocessor circuit might be used in personal computers,
navigation systems or bread machines.
HERBER HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 330 (1999).
596
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compulsory licensing, these types of decisions could discourage
manufacturers’ R&D by casting uncertainty on whether they will
realize the expected return on their investments.601
In contrast, commentators have only criticized the reasoning of the
Kodak II court but not the decision.602 According to Professor
Patterson, the Kodak II court was correct in ordering Kodak to
supply its patented parts to independent service providers.603
Nonetheless, Patterson criticizes the Kodak II court for having
focused on the subjective motivation of Kodak in holding that the
presumption in favor of the legality of Kodak’s commercial policy
had been rebutted. 604 According to Patterson, the IP holder’s
subjective motivation will always be difficult to determine.605
Under Patterson’s user-oriented approach, the outcome of the case
would have been the same.606 Kodak’s refusal to supply its patented
parts to the independent service providers was not related to their use
of its IPRs, but rather to the independent service providers use of
parts where the IPRs were embodied to provide their services to the
copiers’ owners.607 Under this approach, it would not be permissible
for Kodak to refuse to supply its patented parts to ISPs.608
b. The Tide is Turning for Intellectual Property Rights: The
Xerox and Intel Cases
Not all courts have accepted the Kodak II solution to reconcile the
tension between antitrust law and intellectual property law. In the
Intel and Xerox cases,609 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
601

Kauffman, supra note 7, at 526.
Patterson, supra note 254, at 1155-58.
603
Id. at 1135.
604
Id. at 1151-54.
605
Id.
606
See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
607
Notice that this distinguishes Kodak II from Data General, where the independent
service providers needed to use DG’s software to provide their service to owners of DG
computers.
608
Id. at 12-15.
609
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Indep.
Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. (CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.), 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
602
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adopted a more pro-intellectual property right approach.
i. The Intel Case
Intel illustrates the different approaches taken by U.S. agencies
and courts regarding refusals- to-license IPRs. This case involved a
dispute between Intel, the world’s largest designer, manufacturer and
supplier of high performance microprocessors used in desktop
computers, laptops, servers and workstations, and Intergraph, a
workstation manufacturer and one of Intel’s customers.610
In 1993, Intergraph had abandoned its patented Clipper
microprocessor and began incorporating Intel microprocessors into
its workstations.611 The dispute arose when Intergraph asserted its
Clipper patents against several of Intel’s original equipment
manufacturers (“OEM”), based on their use of Intel
microprocessors.612 When settlement negotiations failed, Intel
refused to continue supplying Intergraph with samples of its
computer chips and technical information about new products,
ostensibly to coerce Intergraph to settle these patent claims by crosslicensing to Intel the patented technology in dispute.613
The district court upheld Intergraph’s claim that the advanced
chips, and the secret technical information comprising them, were
essential facilities to allow Intergraph to compete effectively in the
workstations market, and granted a preliminary injunction against
Intel.614 Intel appealed the district court’s order and the Federal
Circuit reversed it.615 The Circuit Court held that the district court
misapplied the essential facilities doctrine.616
Contrary to
Intergraph’s position, the court held that the presence of a
competitive relationship in the market where the monopolistic
behavior is alleged is prerequisite to applying the essential facilities
610
611
612
613
614
615
616

Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1349-50.
Id. at 1350.
Id.
Id. at 1350-51.
See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9681, 4-5.
Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1367.
Id.
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doctrine.617 The court reached this conclusion after warning that the
essential facilities doctrine “is not an invitation to demand access to
the property or privileges of another, on pain of antitrust penalties
and compulsion.”618 On this point there is some similarity between
the Intel judgment and the ECJ’s judgment in Oscar Bronner.619
The court found that Intergraph and Intel did not coexist in any of
the relevant markets, namely, the market for high-end
microprocessors and the graphics subsystems market.620 The court
refused to accept that Intergraph was present in the former by virtue
of its Clipper patents.621 A patent right, the court reasoned, is a legal
right to exclude, not a commercial product in a competitive
market.622 Likewise, and reversing the district court’s findings, the
Federal Circuit held that, even if there were evidence that Intergraph
was planning to enter into the graphics subsystems market, there was
neither evidence nor even a suggestion of monopoly power by Intel
in that market.623 The Federal Circuit ruled that neither under the
essential facilities doctrine, nor under the leveraging monopoly
theory, had Intergraph proved that Intel had monopolized or
attempted to monopolize any of the markets where Intergraph was
active.624 The reasoning of the court is premised on the assumption,
as the court itself stated, that antitrust laws do not have the objective
to protect competitors, but rather competition: “[t]o constitute a
violation, the monopolist’s activities must tend to cause harm to
competition, unrelated harm to an individual competitor or consumer
is not sufficient.”625

617

Id. at 1357.
Id.
619
See discussion infra Section III.B.
620
Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1355.
621
Id.
622
Id.
623
Id.
624
Id. at 1357-60.
625
Id. at 1355. Notice that in the EU Advocate General Jacobs, in his Opinion in Oscar
Bronner, relied on the same argument. See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH Co KG v.
Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1998]
4 C.M.L.R. 112, 130, at ¶ 58 (1999); see also discussion Section III.B.
618
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The court also refused to accept the restrictive approach adopted
by the district court in response to Intel’s argument that its
proprietary information and pre-release products were subject to
copyrights and patents.626 The district court had held that Intel’s
intellectual property did not confer upon Intel the privilege or
immunity to violate antitrust laws.627 Despite agreeing with the
district court on this point, the Federal Circuit noted that the antitrust
laws do not negate the patentee’s right to exclude others from patent
property.628
The court refers to the rebuttable presumption
established by the First Circuit in Data General and the Ninth Circuit
in Kodak II, but does not expressly endorse it.629 It then relied on
Section 271(d)(4) of the Patent Act and on some existing case law
favorable to the right of a licensee to refuse to license its IPRs.630 It
held that an IP holder who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held
liable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for maintaining the market
power he lawfully acquired by refusing to license the patent.631 On
the basis of the precedents mentioned, and the language of Section
271(d)(4) of the Patent Act, the court concluded that the owner of a
proprietary information has no obligation to provide it, whether to a
competitor, customer or supplier.632 The court added that a customer
who is dependent on a manufacturer’s supply of a component cannot,
on that ground, force the supplier to provide it absent an
anticompetitive act.633
The judgment of the court appears consistent with the essential
facilities doctrine as developed by precedent.634 The court’s
acceptance of Intergraph’s position would have been an unwarranted
extension of precedent. The outcome of the case appears to indicate
that the Federal Circuit accepted that Intel’s behavior was motivated
more by its patent and contractual dispute with Intergraph than by
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634

Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1362-63.
Id.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1362-63.
Id.
Id.
Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1362-63.
Id.
Papciak, supra note 522, at 323; HOVENKAMP, supra note 600, at 200.
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any intent to unlawfully maintain or acquire monopoly power in any
of the relevant markets.635
The judgment of the Federal Court in Intel contrasts in two ways
with the approach taken by the FTC in its Complaint brought against
Intel for infringement of Section 5 of the FTC Act.636 First, the FTC
Complaint was brought on the basis of a fuller factual record, i.e.,
Digital was competing with Intel in the microprocessors market.637
Second, unlike the Federal Circuit, the FTC focused on the impact of
Intel’s refusal to license on the innovation markets for
microprocessors.638
As described in Section IV.D.1.b.iii above, the FTC found that
Intel had cut off its supplies of chip samples and strategic
information about its new products to at least three of its main
customers (Compaq, Digital and Intergraph) in order to force these
customers to grant Intel licenses related to microprocessor
technology.639 Intel argued that its withholding of its IPRs from
Compaq, Digital and Intergraph, in response to these firms
withholding their IPRs from Intel, represented a legitimate response
to the threat to microprocessor innovation caused by the existing
“patent minefield.”640 According to Intel, the overabundance of
microprocessor patents threatened to stifle innovation in the market
since a microprocessor manufacturer might be subject to multiple
demands by the holders of these patents.641 In Intel’s view,
microprocessor manufacturers can only neutralize this risk by
pursuing cross-licensing policies.642
The FTC dismissed Intel’s business justification for its conduct
and considered Intel’s behavior exclusionary.643 The FTC held that
635

Papciak, supra note 522, at 340.
In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, (FTC June 8, 1998), 4, ¶ 14, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9806/intelfin.cmp.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
637
Valentine, supra note 5, at 8; In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 4-5, ¶¶ 15-19.
638
Valentine, supra note 5, at 9; In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 3-4, ¶¶ 11-14.
639
Valentine, supra note 5, at 3, In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 3-4, ¶¶ 11-12.
640
Intel Corporation Trial Brief [Public Version], ¶¶ 41-42 (Feb. 25, 1999), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/intelbrief.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2001).
641
Id.
642
Id. at 9, ¶¶ 41-42.
643
In re Intel Corp., No 9288, Complaint, 3-4, ¶¶11-14.
636
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the “natural and probable” effect of Intel’s conduct was to diminish
the incentives of those three Intel customers – as well as other firms
that are Intel customers or otherwise commercially dependent upon
Intel to develop innovations relating to microprocessor
technology.644 According to the FTC, Intel’s exclusionary conduct
effectively undermines the patent rights of such firms and reduces
their incentives to develop new technologies that might compete with
Intel microprocessors.645 The FTC concluded that, by engaging in
these coercive business tactics, Intel had willfully maintained its
monopoly power in the microprocessor market and had also
attempted to monopolize both current and future generations of
microprocessors.646
The FTC proceedings against Intel were resolved by Consent
Decree.647 The Consent Decree required Intel to do precisely the
opposite it would have been entitled to do under the judgment of the
Federal Circuit vacating the injunction of the District Court.648 It
was now required to supply these three customers, and other
customers in the same situation, its confidential new product
information.649
The FTC/Intel case raises the issue of whether the function of U.S.
agencies is to force a proprietor to license its IPRs on the grounds of
the “probable” anticompetitive effects of its refusal on the relevant
market. The answer will depend on whether the protection of future
innovation is conceived as a “good” deserving so much protection so
644

Id. at 4, ¶ 14.
Id.
646
Id. at 9, ¶¶ 41-42.
647
In re Intel Corp., No. 9288, Agreement Containing Consent Order (FTC March 17,
1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9903/d09288intelagreement.htm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2001).
648
Id.
649
Id. The Consent Decree requires Intel, for a period of ten years, to cease impeding
access to its confidential product information for reasons related to situations where the
customer has asserted or threatened to assert any IPRs. Id. It is interesting to note that
under Professor Patterson’s “user approach” theory, one can argue that Intel’s
discriminatory practices were not related to its potential licensees’ “use” of Intel’s IP, but
rather were based instead on whether those licensees had asserted their own IPRs against
Intel. Patterson, supra note 254, at 1159. The FTC Complaint and the Consent Decree are
consistent with this approach. Id.
645
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as to justify setting aside the idea that an IP holder is entitled to any
returns it can get on its IPRs. The FTC in the Intel case and the DOJ
and the district court in the Microsoft case seem to think so. If the
FTC’s views are accepted, it must follow that, despite IPRs, there are
situations in which a firm with monopoly or market power may be
required to create its own competition, as the FTC Complaint and the
district court decision in Intel suggest.650 This is also the approach
that seems to have been adopted by the district court in Microsoft.651
It is important to note that, when the court rejects Microsoft’s
copyright defense to justify the restrictions on original equipment
manufacturers selling Windows with Netscape and the tying of
Internet Explorer to Windows, the court does not mention cases
favoring IPRs’ immunity from antitrust liability, such as the Xerox
case.652 Instead, it relies on those judgments that may be interpreted
as denying such immunity, such as Kodak II and Data General.653
The idea underlying the FTC Complaint is not necessarily wrong.
Innovation markets may deserve antitrust protection. However, as
stated in section IV.D.1.b.iii above, antitrust complaints must be
based on empirical evidence rather than on speculative and
theoretical assumptions on the “possible” or “probable” effects of a
refusal to license in the relevant innovation market. The FTC
Consent Decree and the decision of the district court in Intel may be
seen as part of the same “saga” as Data General and Kodak II. The
FTC and the district court relied on the Ninth Circuit to find intent to
monopolize on the part of Intel.654 As with the Ninth Circuit in
Kodak II, it is unclear how their conclusions may be reconciled with
Supreme Court precedent and the congressional intent of the Patent
Act.655
650
David Balto, Protecting Competition from the abuse of Monopoly Power: The Intel
Case, 16 No. 6/7 COMPUTER LAWYER 4, 9 (1999).
651
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 9, 40-41 (D.D.C. 1999)
(Conclusions of Law).
652
Id.; In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In this
case the Federal Circuit appears to endorse the idea that conduct based on IPRs is immune
from antitrust laws.
653
Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41 (Conclusions of Law).
654
Burling, Lee & Krug, supra note 197, at 541.
655
Id.
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ii. The Xerox Case: Data General and Xerox
Distinguished
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Kodak II has been expressly
rejected by other courts for its inconsistency with Supreme Court
precedent and Section 271(d) of the Patent Act.656 On February 17,
2000, the Federal Circuit rendered its decision affirming the district
court’s ruling for Xerox.657 In this case, Xerox refused to supply
ISOs with replacement parts for its printers and copiers, but allowed
the equipment owners themselves to purchase the replacement
parts.658 An ISO brought suit alleging that Xerox had infringed
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.659 The Federal Circuit denied appeal
of the district court’s ruling in which the district court found that
Xerox’s unilateral refusal to license or sell its patented parts could
not constitute unlawful exclusionary conduct under antitrust laws.660
After the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Kodak II, the plaintiff
requested that the district court reconsider its decision in light of
Kodak II.661
The district court expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit
and confirmed its previous decision.662 The district court argued that
the Ninth Circuit overlooked the distinction between “patent
monopoly” and “economic monopoly,” by assuming that a single
patent can create at most a single “inherent” economic monopoly.663
However, the scope of a patent monopoly is defined by the claims of
a patent, not by the limits of what a court determines is the most
analogous antitrust market, whereas the scope of an economic
monopoly refers to a firm’s power to control the price of a product in
656

Hovenkamp, supra note 205, at 479.
In re Indep. Serv., 203 F.3d at 1329-30.
658
In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1133 (D. Kan. 1997),
aff’d, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
659
Id.
660
In re Indep. Serv., 203 F.3d at 1324.
661
In re Indep. Serv., 989 F. Supp. at 1134.
662
Id. at 1135-37.
663
Id. at 1135.
657
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a properly defined relevant antitrust market.664 This means that a
patent can implicate multiple antitrust markets within which the
patent holder can rely on its claims to exclude third parties from
those markets.665 The district court held that a patent holder’s intent
in exercising its exclusionary power is irrelevant because the right to
exclude competition is expressly authorized by law, provided that
power is exerted within the limits of the patent’s claim.666 The
district court also referred to the Supreme Court ruling in Kodak I.667
There, the Supreme Court reasoned “that power gained through some
natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright or business
acumen can give rise to antitrust liability if a seller exploits his
dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next
market.”668 Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the district court reasoned that
the Supreme Court statement was not applicable where a patent
holder, exercising its unilateral refusal to license or use its invention,
acquires a monopoly in two separate antitrust markets.669 In Xerox,
the court stated that there is no antitrust leveraging of monopoly
power when a patent holder merely exercises its rights inherent in the
patent grant.670
664

Id.
Id.
666
In re Indep. Serv., 989 F. Supp. at 1140-41
667
Id. at 1135.
668
Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479, n. 29 (1992).
669
In re Indep. Serv., 989 F. Supp. at 1135.
670
Id. at 1135. Professor Patterson has suggested that the Xerox court misapplied
Section 271(d) of the Patent Act to the facts of the case. According to Professor Patterson,
contrary to what Xerox argued, Xerox’s behavior cannot be insulated from antitrust laws by
virtue of Subsection (4) of Section 271(d) (no patent owner shall be deemed guilty of
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of having refused to license its
IPRs). As the legislative history makes clear, that Subsection refers to a complete refusal to
license rather than to selective licensing, the latter being the conduct which Xerox was
pursuing. If Subsection (4) is not applicable, then the question that arises is whether
Xerox’s policy of conditioning access to its parts on not purchasing independent repairers’
services could be caught under Subsection (5) of Section 271(d) of the Patent Act, which
renders inapplicable the exemption to the tying policies pursued by a dominant firm. It is
also unclear whether Subsection (5) applies to Xerox’s behavior. Subsection (5) allows two
conflicting interpretations. Xerox argued that Subsection (5) was not applicable because it
only applies to tying agreements but not to a unilateral conditioning of a license on the
purchasing of another product. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee Xerox Corporation 25-32,
In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. (CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.), No. 99-1323 (Fed.
Cir. filed July 14, 1999). Scholars have conflicting views on the correct interpretation of
665
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According to the district court, the Ninth Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion because it implicitly assumed that a single patent
could create a single inherent “antitrust monopoly.”671 This premise
is incorrect. A patent right can implicate multiple antitrust markets,
and the reward of the patented invention is the right to exploit the
entire field of the invention, not just the right to exploit the single
most analogous antitrust market.672
The Federal Circuit again affirmed the district court decision.673
Unlike the district court, which merely referred to Data General, the
Federal Circuit relied on it.674 The Federal Circuit, however, gives
the rebuttable presumption set out in Data General a restrictive
interpretation.675 The Federal Circuit seems to have limited the
possibility of rebutting the presumption to situations of misuse or
unlawful acquisition of IP, while the First Circuit in Data General
did not seem to limit to misuse claims the grounds where the plaintiff
may rebut the presumption.676 Like the district court, the Federal
Circuit expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit, because its
rationale requires an evaluation of the patentee’s subjective
motivation for refusing to sell or license its patented products.677
The court acknowledges that the patentee’s right to exclude is not
without limit.678 However, it is in the identification of such limits
that the Federal Circuit in Xerox differs with the Ninth Circuit.679

Subsection (5). While Professor Patterson disagrees with Xerox’s interpretation of
Subsection (5), arguing that “there is no indication” that Subsection (5) was intended to
apply only to explicit tying agreements, Professor Hovenkamp suggests that the absence of a
contract implies the absence of conditioning with the meaning of Subsection (5). See
Patterson supra note 254, at 1149-51; HOVENKAMP, supra note 574, at 331.
671
In re Indep. Serv., 989 F. Supp. at 1138.
672
Id.; see HOVENKAMP, supra note 600, at 330-31, n. 51.
673
In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329-30 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
674
Id. at 1328-29.
675
Id. at 1329; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir.
1994).
676
Id. at 1329; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir.
1994).
677
Indep. Serv., 203 F.3d at 1327.
678
Id. at 1326.
679
Id. at 1326-28.
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For the Federal Circuit, a compulsory license cannot be ordered,
unless the plaintiff proves at least one of the following conditions: (i)
the defendant obtained its patent through fraud; (ii) the infringement
suit is objectively baseless and subjectively motivated by a desire to
impose collateral, anticompetitive injury, rather than to obtain a
justifiable legal remedy (sham litigation); or (iii) the patent was used
as part of an illegal tying strategy to extend market power beyond the
legitimate scope of the patent grant.680 The plaintiff in the Xerox
case proved none of these conditions.681 Thus, the court ruled that
absent these exceptional circumstances, the antitrust defendant’s
subjective motivation is irrelevant even though its refusal to sell or
license its patented invention may have anticompetitive effects.682
The Federal Circuit referred then to footnote 29 of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kodak I,683 and held that its language does
nothing to limit the right of the patentee to sell or license in markets
within the scope of the statutory patent grant.684 Further, absent
exceptional circumstances a patent may confer the right to exclude
competition in more than one antitrust market.685 The Federal
Circuit gave a clearer interpretation of footnote 29 than the district
court did.686 It attempted to reconcile the Supreme Court’s statement
with its ruling in the Xerox case.687 The Federal Circuit held that the
words in footnote 29 could be interpreted as “restating the
undisputed premise that the patent holder cannot use his statutory
right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market
beyond the scope of the patent.”688 (emphasis added). The Federal
Circuit narrowly interpreted the meaning of “beyond the scope of the
patent” by holding that Xerox’s refusal to license its replacement
parts did not go beyond the scope of the patent because, absent
exceptional circumstances, a patent may confer the right to exclude
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688

Id. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1327-28.
Kodak I, 504 U.S. at 479, n. 29 (1992).
Indep. Serv., 203 F.3d at 1327.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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competition altogether in more than one antitrust market.689
The difference between the Xerox decision of the Federal Circuit
and the Data General and Kodak II decisions is that the Federal
Circuit has created a rule stating that absent those exceptional
circumstances which relate to unlawful acquisition, misuse, or illegal
tying, the use of IPRs is immune from antitrust laws.690 It is worth
pointing out that neither the Commission nor the EC Courts have yet
to issue a decision expressly acknowledging that the use of IPRs is
immune from antitrust liability.
It is premature to speculate on the impact of the Federal Circuit’s
Xerox opinion on lower courts. At least one district court has already
relied on the Federal Circuit’s opinion. In Townshend v. Rockwell
Int’l Corp.,691 the holder of several basic patents over the technology
underlying 56k modems692 sued Rockwell for patent infringement.693
The defendant launched antitrust counterclaims alleging that, inter
alia: Townshend and one of its licensees conspired to fraudulently
obtain the patents; the licensing terms were unfair because (i)
Townshend sought unfair royalty rates; (ii) the licenses were granted
on condition that licensees cross-license their technology to
Townshend; and (iii) Townshend conditioned its licenses on the
resolution of litigation.694 The District Court for the Northern
District of California relied on, among other cases, the Federal
Circuit’s Xerox opinion and dismissed Rockwell’s counterclaims.695
The district court recalled that the Federal Circuit held in Xerox that
“the antitrust laws do not negate a patentee’s right to exclude others
from patent property.”696 Pursuant to this premise, the court held
689

Id.
Id. at 1327-28; Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d. 1147 (1st
Cir. 1994).
691
2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,890, at 87,629 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
692
A modem is a device that allows computer users to connect their electronic
equipment to telephone networks. Id. at 87,629. The 56kps refer to the maximum speed at
which a modem allows such interconnection to take place. Id. According to the definition
of the district court, 56kps modem technology allows a computer user to access information
at 56,000 bits per second. Id.
693
Id. at 87,629.
694
Id. at 87,630.
695
Id. at 87,633.
696
Id.
690
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that, “because a patent owner has the legal right to refuse to license
its patent on any terms, the existence of a predicate condition to a
license agreement cannot state an antitrust violation.”697
IV. A NEW THEORY TO IDENTIFY SITUATIONS THAT MAY WARRANT
THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO REFUSALS TO LICENSE
None of the approaches adopted in the U.S. and the EU toward the
possible application of the essential facilities doctrine to refusals to
license is satisfactory. In the EU, if the Magill doctrine is broadly
interpreted, a dominant IP owner might be required to license its
IPRs to allow a competitor to introduce a new product that would
compete with its own. This implies that the defendant could be
compelled to create its own competition, thereby reducing the value
of its IPRs. In the U.S., Xerox confines the application of antitrust
laws concerning refusals to license to those cases where the plaintiff
proves the defendant’s unlawful acquisition or misuse of IPRs.698
This is a very formalistic approach. It does not take into account
extreme situations, beyond misuse, where the refusal to license an
IPR could seriously harm competition.699 In contrast to the “quasiantitrust immunity” advocated in Xerox, the FTC and some courts
are less sensitive to the protection of IPRs. Under this more
restrictive approach antitrust law may be applicable to refusals to
license either on the basis of the “probable” harm caused by the
alleged anticompetitive conduct in innovation markets (FTC/Intel
and Microsoft), or on the basis of the subjective intent of the
defendant (Kodak II).
Those theories that, on the grounds of the protection of innovation
markets, favor compulsory licensing based on a hypothetical and
speculative analysis of the future consequences of the refusal to
license in the innovation markets are unsatisfactory. Likewise, the
697

Id. at 87,634.
In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135-36 (D. Kan. 1997),
aff’d, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
699
The Xerox ruling has been strongly criticized by some officials of the FTC as
upsetting the traditional balance between intellectual property and antitrust laws. Pitofsky,
supra note 260.
698
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introduction of a subjective-intent test to rebut the presumption that a
refusal to license is a valid business justification may lead to
significant mistakes, since the distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate motives is not entirely clear when a holder refuses to
license its IPRs.700 In light of the shortcomings of the approaches
endorsed by antitrust authorities and courts, it is necessary to
formulate an intermediate theory to allow companies in the U.S. and
the EU to identify situations in which it is justified to require a
proprietor to license its IPRs to a competitor in order to avoid
antitrust liability.
Any theory that is developed to address the interaction between
intellectual property laws and antitrust laws must be based on the
premise that compulsory licensing should be ordered only in very
limited circumstances. It is also essential to require that, whenever
the antitrust authorities and courts in the EU and the U.S. require
compulsory licensing, the plaintiff or the complainant must prove the
existence of a real risk of suffering competitive harm, whether actual
or potential. Compulsory licensing cannot be made dependent on the
subjective intent of the owner, or on the “probable” remote effects of
the challenged behavior in innovation markets, but rather on proving
objectively that the challenged exclusionary or predatory conduct
attributed to the IP owner has, or may reasonably have, the effect of
harming competition.
Without being exhaustive, one may foresee at least one situation
where the application of the essential facilities doctrine to a refusal to
deal may be adequate. If a company, already owning the leading
IPRs in the market, undertakes a policy to aggressively and
systematically buy up every patent that comes along in the relevant
market, and accumulates a very important cluster of patents which
becomes a bottleneck for a third party to enter or remain in the
market, then this third party could rely on the essential facilities
doctrine to force the owner to license its technology.701
It is unclear, however, whether in practice this is a viable cause of
action in the EU and the U.S.. Supreme Court jurisprudence is not
700
701

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 193, 202.
SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 114, at 711.
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entirely clear on the question of antitrust liability for patent
accumulation.702 In Transparent-Wrap Machine Corporation v.
Stokes & Smith,703 the Court suggested that patent accumulation
might be subject to antitrust liability: “As patents are added to
patents a whole industry may be regimented. The owner of a basic
patent might thus perpetuate his control over an industry long after
the basic patent expired. Competitors might be eliminated and an
industrial monopoly perfected and maintained.”704 The Court,
however, appears to have reached the opposite conclusion just three
years later in Automatic Radio Manufacturing. v. Hazeltine
Resources,705 where it held that the “mere accumulation of patents,
no matter how many” is not a Sherman Act violation.706
It is also difficult to anticipate the reaction of the Commission and
the EC Courts towards a cumulative patent complaint. Although
Tetra Pak I was not an essential facilities case, the position of the
Commission invites observers to infer that the Commission would be
receptive toward a complaint of a company against a firm
accumulating patents with an exclusionary purpose.707 In Tetra Pak
I, the Commission found that Tetra Pak had abused its dominant
position by the acquisition of a competitor’s exclusive license
(Liquipak) over an important technology relating to a new UHT
milk-packaging process.708 It is important to note that Elopak, one of
the only two companies capable of competing in the EC with Tetra
Pak, had contributed to the development of this new technology.709
The Commission’s decision concluded that the right to use the
702

Kobak, supra note 69, at 543. Kobak points out that in the U.S. neither the existing
case law nor the IP Guidelines have addressed the issue of under what circumstances (if
any) an aggregation of intellectual property rights held by an individual firm may be
regarded as an essential facility that must be licensed to all competition on reasonable terms.
Id. at 543.
703
329 U.S. 637 (1947).
704
Id. at 647.
705
339 U.S. 827 (1950).
706
Id. at 834.
707
Commission. Decision 88/501/EEC, [1988] O.J. (L 272) ¶ 27. The CFI upheld the
Commission’s decision in Tetra Pak Rausing v. Commission, Case T-51/89, 1990 E.C.R. II309.
708
Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing v. Commission., 1990 E.C.R. II-309, 351, ¶ 8
(1990).
709
Id. at II-349, ¶ 5.
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process protected by the exclusive license “was alone capable of
giving an undertaking the means of competing effectively with
[Tetra Pak] in the field of aseptic packaging of milk.”710 Thus, by
acquiring this exclusive license, Tetra Pak strengthened its
dominance711 in the market for machines and materials for the
aseptic packaging of milk and prevented, or delayed considerably,
the entry of a new competitor in a market where there was already
little competition.712
Finally, one may wonder which theory should be adopted if
antitrust authorities and/or courts were to decide to set aside the proimmunity approach and the subjective-intent approach, as outlined in
the U.S. by the Xerox and the Kodak II opinions respectively.713
Despite not having been adopted by any U.S. court, and despite the
doubts that it poses regarding the balance between incentives and the
application of antitrust laws to IPRs, Professor Patterson’s “useoriented approach”714 might be at least a useful and clear method to
identify those situations where an IP owner may be forced under the
essential facilities doctrine to license its IPRs to its competitors.715
This, of course, does not diminish the view that courts should always
be extremely careful when ordering the compulsory licensing of an
IPR.
In summary, absent a deliberate accumulation of IPRs or, should
Professor Patterson’s theory be adopted by antitrust authorities and
courts, absent a refusal unrelated to the “use” of the intellectual
property, a unilateral refusal to deal should not be subject to antitrust
liability except when IPRs have been misused or unlawfully
obtained. If antitrust authorities and courts extend the essential
facilities doctrine beyond these situations, the effect of a compulsory
license would be to force the IP owner to create its own competition.
This is not the goal that antitrust laws should pursue and it is in stark
710

Commission. Decision 88/501/EEC, [1988] O.J. (L 272) ¶ 27.
Tetra Pak had 91.8% of the EC market in aseptic filling machines and 89.1% of the
market in the relevant cartons. Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak I, 1990 E.C.R. at II-312-13, ¶ 3.
712
Commission. Decision 88/501/EEC, [1988] O.J. (L 272) ¶ 27, ¶¶ 45, 60.
713
In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135-36 (D. Kan. 1997),
aff’d, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1215.
714
Patterson, supra note 254, at 1146-47.
715
See discussion infra Section IV.A.2.
711
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conflict with the very essence of IPRs. The main function of
antitrust laws should not be to compel firms to maximize
competition, but to prevent them from restricting it.716
Patent accumulation or a refusal unrelated to the “use” of the
intellectual property could justify the application of the essential
facilities doctrine to a refusal to license IPRs. However, this would
be dangerous advice, especially in the U.S. Though attorneys
generally should not suggest this course of action firmly to a client, it
may be an approach worth considering.
CONCLUSION
IPRs in the EU and U.S. were previously unscathed by antitrust
liability. The situation has slightly changed, and IPRs are now open
to antitrust liability. In recent years, both in the EU and U.S.,
significant antitrust inroads have been made into the IPR domain
introducing legal uncertainty for IPR owners. Despite these inroads,
the application of the essential facilities doctrine or the monopoly
leveraging doctrine to refusals to license has occurred only in
exceptional cases. Nothing indicates that compulsory licenses based
on U.S. antitrust law or EC competition law will become
commonplace.717 This should allay the fears of those who might
interpret cases such as Magill, FTC/Intel or Kodak II as heralding the
erosion of the privileged status of IPRs.718
In the U.S., with the exception of the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak II
opinion, there appears to be no reported case in which a court has
imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to license IPRs.
The recent judgment of the Federal Circuit in the Intel case shows
the reluctance of U.S. courts to issue compulsory licensing orders. In
the EU’s Magill case, the Commission imposed upon a company the
duty to license its copyright to another company competing in a
downstream market. The potentially severe impact of this case on
IPRs, however, has been neutralized by the narrow interpretation
716
717
718

U.S.M Corp. v. SPS Tech. Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1982).
Forrester, supra note 47, at 35-12.
Fitzgerald, supra note 391, at 161.
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given to it by the Commission and the CFI, and it is not likely to be
repeated. For this reason, there is now more legal certainty in the EU
than in the U.S. for owners of IPRs who refuse to license them to
actual or potential competitors. In the U.S., the Federal Circuit
(Xerox), the Ninth Circuit (Kodak II), and the Federal Circuit and the
FTC in the Intel case, have reached opposite conclusions as to
whether the exercise of IPRs is immune from antitrust laws.
Both in the EU and U.S. the issue of how intellectual property
laws and antitrust laws should interrelate is still unresolved. There
are several different mechanisms to reconcile these fields of law.
Jurisprudence should develop a clear legal theory regarding this
issue, and in the U.S. the problem is ripe for consideration by the
Supreme Court.719 Legislators may also enact statutory provisions
regulating this relationship to avoid the legal uncertainty created by
the jurisprudence on both sides of the Atlantic.720
Finally, frictions between intellectual property laws and antitrust
laws could also be alleviated, especially regarding patents and
similar rights, by narrowing the scope of the claims so that patents do
not cover basic research tools which may be used by potential
competitors.721 By doing so, competitors would be less prone to
719

Freed, supra note 310, at 37.
See Antonio F. Pérez, DOJ’s ‘New’ Antitrust Paradigm Resurrects Outdated
Economics, 7 ANDREWS ANTITRUST LITIG. REP. 18. This scholar has pointed out that, given
that the cost for the computer industry of a wrong decision by the judiciary in the Microsoft
case is likely to be high, the DOJ should have never brought the Microsoft case without
additional policy guidance from the legislative branch. Id.
721
See John H. Barton, Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth
and Sequential Innovation, 2 ANTITRUST 65, 449 (1997). This scholar points out that in
some fields, like biotechnology, patents are very broad and may cover basic research tools.
Id. This concern about broad patents may also be related to computer software. In a
groundbreaking case, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the Federal Circuit held that computer software is patentable
subject matter. Id. Therefore, firms may now attempt to claim broad software patents to
gain a competitive advantage over their competitors who, in turn, could rely on the essential
facilities doctrine to gain compulsory access to patented software. See Christopher S.
Cantzler, State Street: Leading the Way to Consistency for Patentability of Computer
Software, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 423, 424 (2000); see also Suzanne Scotchmer, Cumulative
Innovation in Theory and Practice, GSPP Working Paper 240, U.C. Berkeley, at 16-18
(February 1999), available at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~scotch/ip.html (last visited Mar.
9, 2001) (regarding the effects of broad patents in innovation markets).
720
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request compulsory access to a patent right, and therefore, antitrust
laws would be invoked less frequently to interfere with IPRs.

